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Abstract 
 
International studies almost uniformly conclude that union members receive higher 
wages than their non-union counterparts. This study investigates differences between 
collective and individual salaries using the New Zealand State Services Commission’s 
Human Resources Capability Survey 2005. It explores the impact of collective 
bargaining on pay by controlling for a large number of employee and employer 
characteristics. As very little research has been carried out on the subject in New 
Zealand, I focused on the international literature in order to identify the major factors 
that explain the magnitude of union/non-union wage differential. Major industrial 
changes, which have shaped the NZ public service bargaining structure and its 
outcomes are identified. 
 
A range of statistical tests are used to examine the pay differences between collective 
and individual agreements in New Zealand public service. I, first, carry out basic 
comparisons of the average collective and individual wages across gender, employment 
type, occupations, ethnicity, age, employer size and tenure, followed by numerous 
multivariate regressions to work out the true contributing factors to the union/non-union 
wage differential. Finally, I analyze the results in the unique NZ context to allow new 
ideas and theory to emerge and compare it to international trends. 
 
Looking at the basic comparisons, I found that, in the New Zealand public service, 
employees on individual agreements earn significantly higher wages then those who are 
covered by collective agreements. However, multivariate analyses have revealed a 
different picture. The study found that occupational composition is the largest 
contributor to the variability in collective/individual pay in NZPS. With the exception of 
the senior, high skilled and specialised employees, no pay differential was found 
between collective or individual agreements in the New Zealand public service.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Problem Statement 
 
The purpose of this research is directed to further the knowledge of collective 
bargaining and its impact on pay levels in the New Zealand public service. In particular, 
it investigates the collective/individual wage differential, by controlling for a large 
number of employee and employer characteristics using the New Zealand State Services 
Commission’s Human Resources Capability Survey 2005. This is accomplished by first 
gaining a better understanding of legislative and administrative changes in NZ, more 
precisely, of the historical developments of employment relations in the public service 
that shaped the current bargaining structure and its outcomes. Second, the research 
explores the nature of pay setting procedures and union involvement in them. It then 
identifies the differences in wages between collective and individual agreements 
negotiated in a given bargaining environment, and examines the factors that contribute 
to these differences. The research is empirical in nature and estimates the 
collective/individual wage differential using numerous multivariate regressions. The 
goal of this research is to understand whether or not such a gap exists, the nature of it 
and what are the contributing factors to the possible gap in the environment of the 
public service in New Zealand. 
 
1.2. Research Context 
 
Wage bargaining has been identified elsewhere as a primary function of unions. It 
follows that the union/non-union wage differential is considered an important measure 
of union power (Layard and Nickell, 1985; 1986). There is also an enormous body of 
empirical research internationally on the union/non-union wage differential, using both 
micro- and macro-economic models, demonstrating that union members typically 
receive higher wages than their non-union counterparts(Freeman, 1980;Lewis, 
1986;Card, 1991; Mishel and Walters, 2003).At the same time, though, it is known that 
unions also have a considerable impact on the wages and employment conditions of 
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many non-unionized workers as well (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Mellow, 1981; 
Blanchflower & Freeman, 1992; Belman & Voos, 2004).  
Following the State Sector Act 1988 and under the impact of Employment Contracts Act 
1991, each department in the public service has full control over the determination of 
wages and other conditions and is given very clear criteria in regards to what factors to 
consider when setting wages. These factors relate only to the individual department and 
include the ability to address organizational outcomes, pay within current baselines, 
recruitment and retention issues, and comparisons with others within the department. 
Such bargaining structures have enhanced management discretion and lessened 
employee involvement through their union. Pay terms and conditions are set by 
remuneration systems that are put together with the management prospective in mind. 
The removal of pay from collective agreements has removed one of the main organizing 
functions of the union, while the emphasis on departmental remuneration systems has 
contributed to discrepancies between departments.  
Also, although the ERA curtails the ability of employers to extend collective agreement 
coverage to non-union members, the free riding effect still occurs. New Zealand public 
service was found to be highly unionized (May and Lonti, 2003) with occurrence of 
skill shortages (SSC HRC survey report, June 2005). Where union density is high, it is 
likely that the provisions of negotiated collectives will extend to similar employees who 
are not covered. Furthermore, where there is occurrence of skill shortages, the union 
rate is likely to have a strong influence on the pay and conditions employers with non-
unionized employees would need to offer in order to attract staff. In both situations, it 
would lead to a reduction of the collective/individual differential. 
 
1.3. Research Gap 
 
There is wide agreement within the literature that union members typically receive 
higher wages than their non-union counterparts. (Flanders, 1970; Freeman & Medoff, 
1984; Mellow, 1981; Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992; Kornfeld, 1993; Miller and 
Mulvey, 1994, 1996; Miller, Mulvey and Neo, 1999; Wooden, 2001b; Peetz, 2001; 
Belman and Voos, 2004). 
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Although there is an enormous body of empirical research internationally on the 
union/non-union wage differential, it is yet to be calculated in New Zealand. In 
addition, most of the extant literature on union wage effects is focused on the 
union/non-union wage differential in the private sector. Only few such studies consider 
this phenomenon in the public sector and public service, in particular. Given the 
growing importance of public sector unionism, more studies are expected to be done in 
the future.   
 
New Zealand’s bargaining environment is unique compared to many other industrial 
countries. In New Zealand, there are employees who are union members but are not 
covered by collective agreements, contrary to the more common occurrence in other 
countries (e.g., USA and Canada) where non-union members are often covered by 
collective agreements. Therefore, in New Zealand the union/non-union pay differential 
should be more precisely called the “collective versus individual” pay differential.  
The literature is characterized by a number of apparent contradictions in terms of 
union/non-union wage differential.  Studies have found both union and non-union 
premia, that the differential has changed over time, and varies by worker type, industry, 
firm and occupation. In addition, it is known that unions have a considerable impact on 
the employment conditions of many non-unionized workers as well, substantially 
reducing the union/non-union wage gap (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Mellow, 1981; 
Blanchflower & Freeman, 1992; Belman & Voos, 2004). 
 
A large number of studies, using both micro- and macro-economic models, demonstrate 
that union members receive higher wages than their non-union counterparts (Freeman, 
1980; Lewis, 1986; Card, 1991; Mishel & Walters, 2003). On the contrary, Peetz (2001) 
finds that Australian employees on collective agreements often experience inferior 
terms and conditions to employees on individual contracts, in fact having a “non-union 
premium”. He argues that, in order to induce employees to forsake union coverage, 
employers may offer employees a higher wage through individual bargaining for the 
same type of work. Studies of union avoidance in the United States during the past half 
century come to the same conclusion (Zigray, 2005; Logan, 2006). 
 
Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) note that the union premium is sensitive to estimation 
techniques and data richness. A number of studies point to the conclusion that union-
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nonunion differentials can be explained by employee related characteristics (Cristie, 
1992; Hansen, 1998; Hirsh & Macpherson, 2001). Other researchers focus on firm 
specifics, such as workplace size, and conclude some large differentials reported on in 
the earlier studies are the result of omitted variable bias and, specifically the failure to 
adequately control for workplace differences especially important in a decentralized 
bargaining environment (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). 
 
This study is able to include both individual level data and some workplace related 
specifics, such as organization size and location.  Within this study, I have adapted 
factors used to explain union/non-union wage differentials that have been recognized by 
previous research as relevant to the estimation of the collective/individual wage 
differential in the NZ public service. I identify which workers benefit from a premium 
and how the estimates change by using a number of multivariate analyses.  
 
1.4. Methodology Framework 
 
The focus of the research is on estimating the wage differential between collective and 
individual agreements. This study utilizes data from the State Services Commission’s 
Human Resource Capability (HRC) Survey of 2005. This is the only available source in 
New Zealand of data on collective agreement coverage and union membership status of 
individuals. The HRC Survey contains wide-ranging individual level data on all public 
service department employees, as of June 30, 2005.   
 
I used a range of statistical tests to examine the collective/individual wage differential. I 
first carry out basic comparisons of the average collective and individual wage across 
gender, employment type, occupations, ethnicity, age, employer size and tenure. This is 
followed by numerous multivariate regressions to estimate the impact of various 
contributing factors to the collective/individual wage differential. Finally, I analyze the 
results in the unique NZ context to allow new ideas and theory to emerge and compare 
these results to international trends. 
 
A detailed description of the methodology framework is described in chapter 5. 
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1.5. Research Question 
 
The principle question being addressed in this research is: 
What are the pay differences between collective and individual agreements in New 
Zealand public service, in light of that sector’s unique pay setting practices? 
From the main research question, a number of secondary questions related to the nature 
of the collective/individual wage differential and the contributing factors to these 
differences are developed. These include the following: 
Nature of the collective/individual wage differential  
Is there a collective or individual premium in New Zealand public service? 
What is the nature of the collective/individual pay gap, if there is a gap?  
What is the size of the gap? 
Nature of the contributing factors to the collective/individual wage differences 
What factors/characteristics explain the gap? 
What impact does each of those factors/characteristics – both as a set and separately - 
have on the differential? 
Defining the research questions permitted me to set the boundaries of the study and to 
center my research on a specific topic, as well as to make the most use of the data 
available and work within the data limitations.  
 
1.6. Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis contains 7 following chapters plus 3 appendices.  
Chapters 2 & 3 review the New Zealand public service context. These chapters present 
a broad overview of legislative and administrative changes in the public service in the 
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context of broader legislative and administrative changes in NZ. They introduce the 
bargaining structure and unions’ role in the public service in NZ. Chapter 2 summarizes 
the historical context, which very much sets the scene for the bargaining structure in 
operation in the public service at the present. Chapter 3 describes the remuneration 
systems adopted in the public service (using the Public Service Remuneration Systems: 
Principles and Practice survey published by the SSC in June 2005) to outline the main 
principles and practices used by the government departments to set the pay-fixing 
procedures. I also provide empirical evidence (using the Industrial Relations Centre 
(IRC)’s database) to support the findings of the survey and to enhance our 
understanding of the current remunerations systems in terms of union involvement in 
pay fixing procedures and its impact on union members’ and their non-union 
counterparts’ wages. A detailed description of the IRC database is found in the 
methodology chapter (chapter 5). 
Chapter 4 covers the literature available on union/non-union differentials and the factors 
found to this influence phenomenon. I review international studies, across private and 
public sectors, and public service (a part of public sector that contains government 
departments only), across a large number of countries (mainly, UK, US, Canada, 
Australia and NZ) over a long period of time. I identify a wide range of contributing 
factors that are later measured in the analyses for this study. Finally, I examine the 
relevance to this study of the literature on the NZ public service bargaining structure 
and its outcomes. This literature review is used to:  1) contribute to the understanding of 
the impact of collective bargaining and unionism on wages, in particular how 
union/non-union wage differentials (if they exist) can be explained and are affected; 2) 
identify the variables that might contribute to these differences; and 3) compare the 
results of this study to previously conducted research to explain the phenomenon. 
In Chapter 5, I explore the methodological underpinning of the research. I describe my 
logic in selecting a quantitative research perspective. Next, I describe the dataset used 
for this study and the limitations of the data. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of simple crosstabulations (raw gap) of the average 
collective and individual wage across gender, employment type, occupations, ethnicity, 
age, employer size and tenure. I then provide the results of the multiple regression 
analyses. 
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In Chapter 7, I draw out several broad conclusions and assess the extent to which the 
study has achieved what I set out to do in this research. First, the chapter examines the 
findings of this study against other research summarized in the literature review chapter. 
This is followed by a discussion of the findings and their implications in the wider 
context of the labour market experience of NZ in general and in the public service in 
particular.   
Chapter 8 suggests areas for future research by further exploring the limitations of the 
methodology and dataset described in chapter 5. Finally, tables and references are in the 
attached appendixes. 
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2. Employment legislation context 
 
2.1. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
Before moving on to estimating the collective/individual wage gap, it is appropriate to 
place these results in the wider context of the changes in the labor market experience of 
NZ, in general, and public service, in particular. This section reviews the New Zealand 
public service context. The chapter presents the historical underpinning of NZ current 
public service pay-setting regime. A broad overview of legislative and administrative 
changes in the public service in the context of broader legislative and administrative 
changes in NZ is described. The historical context very much sets the scene for the 
bargaining structure in operation in the public service at the present.  
 
2.2. Prior State Sector Act - 1988 
 
From 1856, ministers had control of their own departments, and salaries and wages set 
by governments (Boston et al., 1996). In the years between 1890 and 1912, the Liberal 
Government significantly expanded the role of the state in the society and economy and, 
correspondingly, the number of government departments and employees. The Hunt 
Public Service Commission was established to report on recommendations for change; 
however, prior to when reports could be made, the Liberal Government was replaced by 
the Reform Party Government, which quickly introduced the Public Service Act 1912. 
The Act set the basis for the modern public service up to 1988 (Boston et al., 1996). The 
Public Service Commissioner was given authority over all personnel and industrial 
matters: appointments, grading, promotions, suspensions, dismissals, and pay and 
conditions. Public servants were given priority rights of appointment to any position 
within the public service. Conditions of employment were set by senior and independent 
public servants rather than politicians. Pay-fixing became the most controversial part of 
the 1912 settlement. Moreover, public servants had no access to compulsory arbitration 
or bargaining rights with the Commissioner. A similar situation, euphemistically called 
“public begging”, had appeared in the USA and Canada prior to the 1960s.  
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Understandably, pressure grew from the NZ state sector unions for a different system of 
pay-fixing. Throughout the democratic world, the Labour Government accepted, 
however unenthusiastically, the need for a change by enacting the Government Services 
Tribunal Act in 1948. The Act required that pay in the state sector be governed by a set 
of principles and criteria. The main principle was that pay and employment conditions 
in the public sector should be fairly comparable with those existing in the private sector. 
That was based on the state’s need to employ and maintain the appropriate number and 
level of staff and to reward those staff on some equitable basis. This was to be achieved 
by either comparing state employees with comparable employees in the private sector 
or, where no direct outside comparison was available, pay was to be fixed by 
comparison with other groups within the state services, preferably those who were 
themselves linked to the private sector (Labour and Employment Gazette, August 1964;, 
PSA report, 2004; Boston et al., 1996).  
These rules limited government’s ability to implement sufficient power over the 
determination of employment conditions in the public sector, which made both 
Governments (National and Labour) unhappy. By accepting the fair - relativity system, 
the government effectively imported outcomes of the private sector arbitration system 
into the public sector. These pay levels were set by a far less regulated process than that 
which had applied prior to the change. Furthermore, union membership levels grew in 
the public sector; unions became more confident and efficient, which led to a rise in 
industrial militancy. Every tool, political and industrial, was used to pursue the same 
pay levels that drove the unregulated private sector. Unions also took advantage of the 
system to secure non-remuneration benefits (such as leave entitlements) that were 
substantially superior to those in the private sector. This era, from the end of the World 
War II through to the late 1950s was notable for the increasing influence of the Public 
Service Association in personnel management (pay fixing) in the state sector. 
In 1987, the Labour Government introduced the Labour Relations Act to direct 
bargaining in all sectors to the level of enterprise. This was to be achieved by the 
principle that any set of workers could be covered by only a single set of negotiations. 
The public sector came under the provisions of the law regulating industrial relations in 
the private sector. A Labour Court was introduced to resolve disputes of rights while the 
Arbitration Court focused on disputes of interest. Union monopolies were removed and 
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unions could opt out of awards. In the public service, despite the new bargaining 
structure, job categories were standardized across the service, and pay and conditions 
applying to them varied little from one department to another. 
To summarize, pay fixing procedures changed between 1912 and 1988, and they were 
perennially controversial. Following the 1912 Act, pay-fixing remained subject to 
political influence despite being formally under the control of the Public Service 
Commissioner. Prior to the Government Service Tribunal Act 1948, public sector 
unions, unlike their private sector counterparts had no bargaining rights and no access to 
compulsory arbitration (Boston et al, 1996). The 1948 Act established a pay-fixing 
system based upon equality relative to the private sector, gained, if need be, through 
compulsory arbitration by an independent tribunal (Walsh, 1991b). The basic structure 
of pay-fixing remained from 1948 to the 1980s (Powell, 1989). It was not until the State 
Sector Act 1988 that employment practices in public service were placed on a 
comparable level to the private sector.  
 
2.3. The State Sector Act 1988 
 
Prior to the State Sector Act 1988, employment relations in the public service were 
controlled from the centre. The State Services Commission (SSC) acted as the 
Government’s central employing agency of the public service staff, negotiating and 
monitoring their employment conditions. Public sector unions were strong and had 
enjoyed high levels of membership. The process of decentralization in the public service 
began in the mid to late 1980s. Management positions had been removed from 
collective bargaining coverage and fixed term contracts were introduced to establish 
employment conditions. Under the State Sector Act, state sector unions became, for the 
first time, registered trade unions in line with the union registration provisions of the 
LRA. Registered unions enjoyed the exclusive right to represent the group or groups of 
workers, defined in the union’s membership rules in negotiations for an award or 
agreement (Walsh, Harbridge & Crawford, 2001).   
With the introduction of the State Sector Act (SSA) 1988, which brought the state under 
the same regime as private sector workers (i.e. Labour Relations Act 1987) and the 
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passage of the Employment Relations Act (ECA) 1991, a new era of state pay fixing was 
brought into being. The State Sector Act precipitated the organization the public service, 
bringing with it major changes to industrial relations and wage-fixing arrangements. It 
changed the relationship between Ministers and Heads of Departments. Permanent 
Heads of government departments were replaced by Chief Executives, appointed on a 
limited term contract with the possibility of renewal up to 5 years. It was the end of the 
unified public service. Chief Executives were made employers of their staff and were 
thus responsible for pay-fixing and conditions of employment (Boston et al., 1996).  
Union membership had always been voluntary in the State Sector. Even though the SSA 
allowed for a compulsory unionism, the majority of unions decided to retain voluntary 
membership, giving faith in their members and their reasons for joining in the first 
place. In fact, membership levels remained very high. 
The single most important industrial relations change associated with (but not directly 
caused by) the State Sector Act, though, was to the structure of bargaining in the public 
service. A shift to departmental bargaining had, in fact, been agreed by the SSC and the 
Public Service Association (PSA), the union representing State Sector employees, 
shortly prior to the SSA. It reflected the Unions’ awareness that issues facing members 
were department specific and the employers’ concern for more flexible and 
decentralized bargaining units. Nevertheless, while the structure of bargaining 
arrangements has changed, the process of bargaining itself remained highly centralized 
(Boston et al., 1996). As such, the new decentralized system still generates fairly 
uniform bargaining outcomes (including pay). For this matter, it is difficult to see how 
similar organizations operating in similar environments and labor markets and under 
similar pressures could do otherwise.  
Following the SSA, departments, independent organizations, moved from the traditional 
service-wide determination system to one of individual national departmental collective 
agreements, ignoring geographical, divisional or occupational diversity. Ranges of rates, 
in place of salary scales, were introduced to respond to occupational and regional labor 
market situations. In some cases, if more than one union had coverage (members), more 
than one collective employment contract (CEC) was negotiated. Previously, employees 
at all levels were covered by collective agreements. But, now, the argument was that 
senior management, as the employer’s representative, should not be involved (i.e., 
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covered by a collective agreement), even indirectly, in negotiating an agreement in 
which they had a personal interest.   
The SSC was driven to exclude senior staff in all sectors from the collective bargaining 
coverage and to shift them on to individual employment contracts. Moreover, individual 
contracts were valued in their own right as contributing to the development of a new 
management culture and as enhancing accountability (Boston et al., 1996). In return for 
industrial democracy and union facilities in most departmental agreements, the PSA 
agreed to senior officials being placed on individual contracts. Progressively, this was 
also extended down to the third level of management and was broadened to include staff 
with any involvement, as employer representatives, in the negotiating process. 
The other significant development in the public sector was the growth of limited-term 
employment contracts. This indirectly resulted from a continuous restructuring process, 
which encouraged departments to appoint staff as needed for specific projects on a 
short-term basis. These public servants were employed on individual contracts.  The 
occurrence of such contracts was never large, however it created an impression out of 
proportion to their frequency, and it helped foster the notion that traditional concepts of 
lifetime service and public service loyalty were fast disappearing.  
The rule of “equal pay for equal work”, which was introduced under the Government 
Service Equal Pay Act 1960, was potentially compromised, leaving the decision at the 
hands of employer, which was based on skills, level of education, experience, and other 
personal attributes of a candidate. Unions’ goal was to maintain the living standards of 
their members, to build a more effective union representation and to strengthen already 
negotiated conditions of employment. Unions were consulted in the process, but the 
ultimate decision on terms and working conditions was reached by the management. 
To summarize, from 1988 to 1991, the negotiation of employment conditions (including 
pay) throughout the state sector remained under tight SSC control (Walsh, 1993b). In 
the public service, collective bargaining was shaped by the key role played by the SSC 
as an employer party. The Labour Government established a special Cabinet Sub-
Committee on State Wages, which was continued by the National Government 
following the election in 1990, to lay down policy for state sector employment 
negotiations and to oversee this process. 
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The SSC’s role as an employer party for the negotiation of employment conditions was 
seen as a contradiction of the decentralizing philosophy behind the State Sector Act and 
the Labor Relations Act. Public service departments often had very limited industrial 
relations experience and the Government wanted to ensure that inexperienced 
negotiators did not jeopardize its fiscal stance. The degree of direct control exerted by 
the SSC, nevertheless, varied across departments. The SSC’s assessment was based on a 
number of factors, including industrial relations expertise within departments, their size 
and the likelihood of industrial action.  
Each year, the SSC and the PSA would begin negotiations in a number of departments. 
The negotiations would continue despite deadlock, adjournments, and threats of 
industrial action until a settlement was reached in one department. That settlement 
would quickly become the standard and be disseminated throughout all public service 
departments. There was some flexibility on particular conditions of employment, which 
could vary to some degree from one department to another. Nevertheless, the new 
process of pattern bargaining instigated an outcome not so dissimilar from the 
centralized and uniform system of the past.  
Pay outcomes in public sector collective bargaining were below those achieved in the 
private sector in this period. Both Labour and  National Governments were determined 
to send to public servants at all levels a message that annual budgets would no longer 
finance unwisely negotiated wage increases and that their tight fiscal stance set severe 
limits to pay increases. Conspicuously, however, this was not the case at senior levels 
(employed on IECs), where salaries moved ahead very quickly and substantially. Priory 
to the SSC Act, negotiations had been conducted on the basis of existing conditions 
from which advances would be made by unions and employees. But, an attempt to 
‘claw back’ on previously negotiated conditions or reverse past gains was a reflection of 
the new regime and its managerial emphasis (Boston et al., 1996). The elimination of 
compulsory arbitration made such a policy feasible for the first time. Since it could no 
longer be undermined by an arbitrated settlement, this policy was remarkably 
successful. 
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2.4. Employment Contracts Act 1991 
 
The same provisions of the ECA applied in the state sector to the same extent as in the 
private sector. The Employment Contracts Act 1991 showed an explicit preference for 
individual agreements over collective bargaining to establish conditions of work. In 
addition, collective bargaining was no longer the exclusive domain of unions. This 
resulted in a drop in the number of union members in both the private and public 
sectors. Furthermore, where a union-negotiated collective contract was in place, 
employers tended to extend the same conditions to non-union employees, making free- 
riding common practice (Harbridge and Honeybone, 1996; Anderson, 1991; Dannin, 
1997) in the public sector as well as in the private sector. In the public sector, unions 
were returned to the situation that had applied prior to the State Sector Act 1988. That 
is, public sector unions were no different than any other non-trading body corporate. 
(Walsh et al., 2001). Employees could choose a negotiating representative; this might be 
a union, a lawyer, a consultant or anyone else (Kelsey, 1997-1998). The power of the 
PSA, a large and diverse organization, in the public service was weakened by the 
gradual desertion of dissatisfied groups in favor of other unions, alternative bargaining 
agents, or self-representation by members who decided to act on their own behalf. The 
Employment Contracts Act broke the automatic link between trade union membership 
and representation and created the potential for state sector unions to be challenged as 
the dominant bargaining parties in that sector. 
The Act prohibited discrimination on the grounds of membership or non membership of 
a union, although, union membership was voluntary and employees could authorize any 
bargaining agent to negotiate individual or collective contracts (Walsh et al., 2001; 
Kelsey, 1997-1998). A 1996 survey of PSA members showed that 20 percent of the 
members joined for cost-benefit reasons only, not because they believed in unions or 
wanted to be part of a collective. However, members who believed in unions and were 
committed to union principles still amounted to 45 percent of the PSA’s members. The 
outbreak of industrial action across the state sector in 1996 reflected the strong 
commitment of many rank and file workers to direct action, despite the more 
conservative and managerial approach of the union executive (Kelsey, 1997-1998). 
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Notwithstanding these changes, the membership levels of state sector unions did not fall 
greatly. The main reasons for this include the small number of employers, the well-
established tradition of voluntary membership, the large size (by NZ standards) of a 
high proportion of state sector workplaces, and the cooperative focus of unions on 
professional and employment issues (Boston et al., 1996). According to one estimate, 
overall trade union membership in NZ fell by 30 percent from December 1991 to 
December 1995, whereas unions in the public service lost only 13 percentage points in 
that time (Crawford et al, 1995). 
As it was imposed by the SSA and reinforced by the ECA, senior and managerial public 
servants were pressured by their employers to leave collective agreements in favour of 
individual agreements, which minimized the collective power of those agreements and 
sets up a scenario for differential outcomes by grouping Throughout the State Sector, 
there were a handful of individual employees below managerial level who were 
exercising the option to be employed on individual contracts, often at the annoyance of 
senior management. The former preferred to have them on standardized agreements 
and, as a rule, their employment conditions did not vary from those offered on 
collective agreements. Moreover, for those employees, as well as for those who were 
employed on individual employment contracts (IEC) as a temporary solution, due to 
their collectives having expired, their employment conditions were effectively 
determined by collective rather than individual bargaining.  
The 1991 Act provided a supportive environment for a number of the industrial changes 
that began to occur under the 1988 Act. For one, a gap grew between the more senior, 
highly skilled or specialized public service and those in lower paid occupations, a gap 
highly detrimental to women, as they were more likely to occupy the lower paid 
positions (Boston et al., 1996). 
Nonetheless, while the whole public sector faced serious wage declines, public service 
only lost 1.4 percent. This reflects the fact that, there was a big difference between 
collective and individual contracts. Moreover, since 1991, the bargaining structure has 
substantially changed in NZ. In the public service, CEs gained negotiating authority 
with SSC maintaining close interest in employment conditions. There was little 
variation across departmental collective contracts in terms of core non-wage conditions 
of employment (i.e. various forms of leave, allowances and expenses), with pay 
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increases being mainly determined through individual bargaining. However, the pre-Act 
bargaining structure of a single national departmental agreement has remained. The 
shift from a unified service to each CE acting as an employer of staff has been the most 
important source of diversity. In addition to that, the move from a bargaining system 
based almost completely on collective bargaining to one that combines individual and 
collective employment contracts and mixes standard permanent employment with fixed-
term contracts and other non-standard arrangements, including the use of external 
contractors and consultants was another source of diversity. Moreover, as a result of 
individual agreements’ growth, unions in the public service suffered a substantial loss of 
influence over managerial employment conditions (Boston et. al, 1996). However, the 
extent of this diversity should not be overestimated. The non-remuneration conditions 
of employment still tend to be the same across individual and collective contracts, as is 
to be expected given similar labour market conditions. The PSA was not involved in the 
negotiation of individual agreements, but was able to provide consulting services to help 
employees to negotiate their individual agreements.  
The objectives of the ECA clearly indicated that the previous Act no longer offered a 
useful structure for the employment relationship. It also made it clear that there would 
be no return to compulsory unionism, national awards, and compulsory arbitration 
(Fosterand McAndrew, 2003).  In the public service, in most cases and for the first time, 
management had the opportunity to communicate and develop a direct bargaining 
relationship with their staff and to build a sense of commitment and organizational 
loyalty. As a result, unions faced difficulties remaining relevant in the workplace. In 
this context, establishment of a range of rates became a double-edged sword for unions. 
They proved to be the vehicle for increased wages for many union members in a period 
where wage rates themselves were static, but this meant that pay increases were 
achieved on the basis of performance assessments of some kind. In the state sector, the 
structure established under the SSA 1988 and the ECA 1991 facilitated an aggressive 
approach by employers which had a negative impact on unions and their power (i.e., the 
ability to negotiate competitive employment conditions, including pay). Yet, the main 
threat to the role of unions in the public sector does not come less from a direct 
management assault than from an erosion of unions standing with their members as a 
consequence of their inability to be deliver improved working conditions. What did 
work in unions’ favour was that, following high rates of unemployment, many 
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employees still felt insecure and there was, hence, a perceived need for unions as a 
means of defense against prevailing market forces.  
2.5. Employment Relations Act 2000 
 
The new government (Labour) quickly set about implementing a set of significant 
reforms, particularly in the area of employment arrangements. 
It is in the area of collective bargaining that the Employment Relations Act (ERA) 2000 
has its most obvious impact on employment relationships. The ERA gives unions a 
monopoly over collective bargaining, promotes the concept of “good faith” bargaining 
and supports multi-employer bargaining. Employees may agree to be bound by either a 
collective or individual employment agreement, although they must be union members 
to be bound by the former. Free- riding1 is unlawful, and employees who are covered by 
a collective agreement must belong to a union. The Act also sets specific terms and 
conditions of individual agreement if employee is a union member. 
Whilst some important changes have been made to bargaining parameters in the broader 
labor market, these have made little practical difference to the entrenched culture of 
bargaining that exists in the public service. The provisions of the ERA apply equally to 
all sectors, however the public service is also subject to the State Sector Act 1988 and 
other governing legislation. In particular, the role of the State Service Commissioner 
and the “good employer” and Equal Employment Opportunities (EEO) obligations of 
state sector employers remain unchanged from the specifications in the State Sector Act 
1988. Hence, whereas the ERA introduced provisions that make new bargaining 
structures possible, particularly MECAs (multi-employer collective agreements). 
Despite this and the fact that the PSA recognizes the value of centralized bargaining, the 
public service retained its decentralized bargaining structure. More to the point, 
                                                 
1 ‘In the labor union context, a free rider is an employee who pays no union dues or agency shop fees, but 
nonetheless receives the same benefits of union representation as dues-payers’. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_rider_problem). In December 2004, “the Act was amended to address 
the undermining of collective bargaining or collective agreements by employers who automatically pass 
on collectively bargained terms and conditions to employees not covered by that collective bargaining or 
agreement”. 
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decisions on whether to undertake multi-employer bargaining depend not only on the 
legislative means to affect bargaining in a multi-employer basis, but also on the attitude 
of employers and whether they support the strengthening of union organization in the 
current competitive economic environment (May and Lonti, 2003).  
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3. Bargaining structure 
 
3.1. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
This chapter follows the previous one by introducing the bargaining structure and 
unions’ role in the public service in NZ. I then describe the remuneration systems 
adopted in the public service, using the public service remuneration systems survey 
published by the SSC in June 2005 to underline the main principles and practices used 
within the government departments to set pay. I also provide empirical evidence from 
the IRC database to support the findings of the survey and to deepen the knowledge of 
these remunerations systems in terms of union involvement in pay fixing procedures 
and its impact on union members’ and their non-union counterparts’ wages.  
 
3.2. Public service 
 
New Zealand’s public service is characterized today by single-employer bargaining. 
Each department has full control over the determination of wages and other conditions 
of its employees and is given very clear criteria in regards to what factors to consider 
when setting wages. These factors relate only to the individual department and include 
the ability to address organizational outcomes, pay within current baselines, recruitment 
and retention issues, and comparisons with others within the department. Any 
managerial coordination of bargaining between departments that exists is via the 
requirement of the SSC to be involved in being informed about the planning and 
progress of bargaining. Bargaining parameters set out deliberately to prevent 
departments from setting standards or executing proposals that have a likelihood of 
“flow-on”. It is through this particular effect that unions have an opportunity to improve 
minimum standards and improve wages and conditions for their members within 
departments. Departments are advised by the SSC to alter pay to their own specific 
needs. To help Chief Executives follow the advice, their performance is measured, 
among other criteria, by their ability to meet their department’s financial goals. At the 
same time, unions take advantage of the situation created by the competitive economic 
environment to negotiate more favorable pay and conditions than they would in a 
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centralized bargaining structure (May and Lonti, 2003; PSA report, 2004, SSC survey, 
2005).   
The historical context very much sets the scene for the bargaining structure in operation 
in the public service at present. The ERA brought the public sector bargaining strategy 
in line with the NZ political and industrial environment. Several Government policies 
have seen a move to more collective bargaining. However, data collected by the SSC 
shows that around 46 percent of public servants are currently employed on individual 
agreements, with 58 percent belonging to a union, meaning that some employees retain 
their union status despite their or their employer’s preference to negotiate individual 
employment agreements. For those members who are employed on individual 
agreements, the PSA provides a consultancy service to assist them in the negotiation of 
their agreements or the resolution of disputes arising out of them. Those employees 
remain members mainly because of their belief in the union movement and the union’s 
importance as a political agent more than a bargaining agent (from interviews with PSA 
and public service officials).  
The number of public servants employed on collectives has risen from 17 percent in 
1994 to 49 percent in 2005 (SSC Annual Report, 2005). Twenty-eight government 
departments are currently party to collective agreements, whereas 7 departments are on 
individual agreements exclusively.  For this latter group of departments, unions play no 
role whatsoever in setting of pay and other working conditions. These departments are 
small and employ only 2 percent of all staff in the public service.  
Eleven departments have between 60 and 75 percent on collective agreements. These 
departments are mostly large and employ 62 percent of all government personnel. 
Hence, given that the majority of staff is collectively covered in these departments, it 
would be reasonable to assume that those collective agreements set the terms and 
conditions of the non-unionized equivalent staff in the departments. Even though the 
latest legislation sets implicit rules about collectively bargained terms and conditions to 
employees who are not union members, in practice, it does not prevent the employer 
offering other employees the same terms as those in collective agreements 
(www.ers.dol.govt.nz).   
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The Public Service Association (PSA) is the traditional representative of public service 
employees in New Zealand. Seventy-six percent of union members belong to the PSA, 
making PSA the largest union in the public service. A small proportion of employees 
are members of other unions, e.g. National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), New 
Zealand’s Finance sector union (Finsec), New Zealand Educational Institute (NZEI), 
Taxpro2 and Central Amalgamated Workers Union (CAWU). 
The general movement in public service pay has been slow compared to other sectors in 
recent years. In one year to June 2005, the public service showed an increase of 1.5% 
compared to 2.5 % increase in the private sector. During the year to June 2005,, the 
average annual pay increases for the permanent employees in the public service was 
5.7% (SSC Annual Report, 2005), and the movement was not uniform: some didn’t 
receive any pay increase and some received lump sum performance payments, which 
did not affect pay rates. This has led to recruitment difficulties, skill shortages and skill 
gaps. However, as noted earlier, it is not the same situation for all occupations. 
Employers tend to offer higher salaries to senior, high skilled or specialized employees 
to attract and maintain them in the public service positions.  
 
3.3. Pay setting in the public service 
 
Bargaining over remuneration is central to the traditional activity of unions. The PSA’s 
approach to remuneration requires that the union actively pursue it as an issue for 
collective negotiation and agreement, and that is done within the bargaining strategies 
and principled approaches and policies of the union.  The Government expects that 
minimum pay rates will be a matter of negotiation in the collective agreement. 
The bargaining structures in the public service have enhanced management discretion 
and lessened employee involvement through their union. However, public service 
remuneration systems were designed, in part, to have mechanisms that incorporate and 
encourage employee and union involvement. Despite the emphasis on departmental 
remuneration systems that led to the removal of pay from collective agreements in a 
                                                 
2 Taxpro Inc. was established to represented employees of the Inland Revenue Department (those who did 
not belong to any other union) 
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large number of government departments, unions retained their involvement in pay 
settings through remuneration systems. Overall, unions involved in the design, review, 
and/or adjustment of departmental remuneration systems. For the majority of 
departments (over 80 percent) the union is involved in the remuneration system as a part 
of the adjustment to pay ranges. Thirty six percent of departments have an 
administrative requirement in place to have union agreement on the range adjustments. 
Finally, around 30 percent of departments include the review of pay scales as a part of 
collective bargaining, whereas for the remaining departments the review of pay scales 
happens outside of the collective bargaining. In some but not in all cases, systems that 
include some aspect of review or design as part of bargaining also require union 
agreement on the same aspect. Note, that 7 departments out of 35 are not engaged in 
collective bargaining and do not have a collective agreement (SSC report, 2005). 
 
Data collected by the SSC show that 40,325 people were employed in the public service 
at 30 June 2005. Fifty-four percent were on collective agreements (current and expired) 
and 58 percent of employees were union members. Under the Employment Relations 
Act, it is mandatory to include a clause defining the salary, wage rates or method of 
payment. The majority of the collective agreements mentioned above contain a mix of 
discrete wage rates, such as steps, and ranges of rates (i.e., a minimum and a maximum 
figure are specified and actual rates are determined through collective bargaining within 
this range). The remaining collectives do not contain wage clauses; instead, they only 
make references to ranges of pay rates. These references include links to general 
remuneration systems that covered employees outside the specific collective agreement. 
These are examples of a standard clause: 
“A grade will be established for the job, which requires the job to be evaluated, 
and assessed by comparing it with other jobs in the department and in the 
market” – DIA remuneration system 
“The Ministry will establish remuneration ranges for similar jobs in the 
Ministry, using information from job evaluation, market survey, the case on 
difficulty of recruitment and retention, and the ministry’s ability to pay. The 
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remuneration paid to an employee within the remuneration range established for 
the job will depend on performance.” 
“All positions are assigned a salary step within bars using the MQM Hay Job 
evaluation system.” 
Remuneration is comprised of “a base salary, performance pay, other cash payments, 
and benefits such as superannuation or the provision of a vehicle.” (SSC, 2005) 
The main features of these remuneration systems are to encourage employee and union 
involvement, to determine internal and external relativities and to recognize the 
development of individual capacity, such as skills, knowledge and competence. They 
also aim to produce equitable outcomes for all employees (equity). In practice, the 
system is adaptable and able to deal with (some) differences in individual circumstances 
and/or changes in the internal and external environment, among other criteria. 
Twenty-eight out of 35 public service departments responded to the SSC survey in 2005 
on remuneration systems. Thirty-eight different remunerations systems were found. The 
vast majority of the responded departments had one system in place; however some 
operate with two, three or even four different systems. A number of reasons were 
identified for a department to adopt a certain remuneration system. Among others, the 
most common were to reward high performance (34% of systems) and to ensure 
relativity with the market/best practice (26%). Job size is the main design principle 
underpinning the remuneration systems; competencies, performance or a mix of those 
criteria were also used in the design. 
Although there are departments (70%) where remuneration discussions are outside the 
collective agreement, unions are involved in a very powerful consultative forum. For 
some other departments, however, the consultative forum involves informing the union 
of decisions over remuneration, rather than offering any genuine engagement. 
Sixty-six percent (25 departments) reported on having some form of union involvement. 
Sixty-eight percent (17) of these included the union in the system design, while 80 
percent (20) involved a union to be a part of the adjustments of pay. Finally, thirty-six 
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percent (9) of the systems included an administrative requirement to have union 
agreement on the range/scale adjustment. 
Forty percent (10) agreed to include review of the remuneration system as part of the 
collective bargaining, 28 percent (7) included design and another 28 percent (7) 
included review of the pay ranges/scale as part of the collective bargaining. It should be 
noted, though, that four out of the 28 government departments that participated in the 
survey did not have a collective agreement in place. Also, for three of the 38 
remuneration systems, salary ranges were used for general staff roles, but not for the 
management roles also covered by the system. 
A system groups salaries into a series of ranges or bands, with job size3 as the criterion 
for assigning jobs to ranges. In most cases, pay ranges were not specified in the 
collective agreement and, in the handful of systems that did, not all ranges were 
specified. 
In summary, the current bargaining structure reinforces the structure of bargaining that 
developed during the era of the SSA and the ECA by, among other things, departments 
being advised by SSC to alter remuneration systems to their own specific needs and 
circumstances. Departments are driven by the need to achieve corporate objectives, to 
improve staff performance and to develop staff. Moreover, departments are required to 
keep pay within current baselines. Despite the removal of legislative obligation to 
maintain relativity with the private sector, in practice, it remains important to CEs to 
match the private sector ‘rate’ in order to be able to recruit and retain able staff. In 
addition, CEs should not favor remuneration systems which “allow salary progression 
for time spent in the job,” and choosing performance, competency, and relativities 
(internal and market) to determine pay progression. 
Under the ECA, the PSA was forced to reach a compromise with the National-led 
Government in order to survive. This resulted in the removal of pay from the majority 
(approximately 70 percent) of collective agreements negotiated between the PSA and 
the Chief Executives. Where pay settings remained a component of collective 
bargaining, the union often was compelled to accept a reduction in pay in order to 
protect the jobs of its members. Ranges of rates and performance pay were introduced 
                                                 
3 Job size points cover the level of knowledge, skills and accountabilities required to do different jobs. 
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to forsake unionism. Despite all that, union membership levels remained high in the 
public service simply because public servants believed they have to speak up for the 
public through collective voice, even if there was a price to pay.  
The ERA brought pay setting back to the bargaining table. By 2005, only 30 percent of 
the collective agreements negotiated between the PSA and CEs excluded pay from 
collective agreements. However, while the legislation has changed, the legacy of the 
previous bargaining structure, with links to employer-dominated remuneration systems, 
remains basically intact. Unions still have some form of involvement in and impact of 
the public service remuneration systems.  
Also, the extent of diversity in pay outcomes should not be overstated. Central 
government employees (i.e., public service) still enjoy broadly similar conditions of 
employment, as should be expected due to similar labour market factors, collective 
culture that has been long standing and union-based collective bargaining remains 
vitally important. 
The ERA curtails the ability of employers to extend collective agreement coverage to 
non-union members. This is not to suggest that free riding is not occurring. Especially 
where union density is high, it is likely that the provision of negotiated collective 
agreements will extend to similar employees who are not unionized. Moreover, where 
there are skill shortages, such as in the NZ public service, the union rate is likely to have 
a strong influence on the pay and conditions employers with non-unionized employees 
would need to offer in order to attract staff. 
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4. Literature review 
 
4.1. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
This section covers the literature available on the union/non-union differentials and the 
factors contributing to this phenomenon. Within this section, I review the international 
studies, across private and public sector, and public service when available, across a 
large number of countries (mainly, UK, US, Canada, Australia and NZ, when available) 
over a long period of time. I identify a wide-range of contributing factors that later used 
in the analyses for this study. Finally, I examine the relevance of the literature to the NZ 
public service bargaining structure and its outcomes. This literature review is used to:  
1) contribute to the understanding of the impact of collective bargaining and unionism 
on wages, in particular how union/non-union wage differential (if exist) can be 
explained and are affected; 2) identify the variables that might contribute to these 
differences; and 3) compare the results of this study to previously conducted research to 
explain the phenomenon. 
Wage bargaining has been identified elsewhere as a primary function of unions. It 
follows that the union/non-union wage differential is considered an important measure 
of union power (Layard and Nickell, 1985; 1986). There is also an enormous body of 
empirical research internationally on the union/non-union wage differential, using both 
micro- and macro-economic models, demonstrating that union members receive higher 
wages than their non-union counterparts. At the same time, though, it is known that 
unions also have a considerable impact on the employment conditions of many non-
unionized workers as well. To summarize the findings from this body of research, one 
could say it is well established that the “union wage premium” accrues to union 
members as well as to non-members in some labour markets (Flanders, 1970; Freeman 
& Medoff, 1984; Mellow, 1981; Blanchflower & Freeman, 1992; Kornfeld, 1993; 
Miller & Mulvey, 1994, 1996; Miller, Mulvey & Neo, 1999; Wooden, 2001b; Peetz, 
2001; Belman & Voos, 2004). 
Numerous theories have been offered to explain this phenomenon. Lewis (1963) 
identified two effects of unionization on the wages of non-union workers. The first is a 
“spillover effect”, where higher union wages compel unionized employers to cut their 
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levels of employment, hence creating higher levels of unemployment and downward 
pressure on non-union wages (Lewis, 1963; 1990; Farber, 2005). Colbjornsen and 
Kalleberg (1988) conducted research in the Scandinavian countries, which are 
characterized by high levels of unionization (Neumann et al., 1991) but, at the same 
time, the economic advantage of belonging to a union seems to be particularly small (Le 
Grand, 1989). In their study, they explained this by occurrence of substantial spillover 
effects. With a high degree of unionization, unions have a strong influence on wage 
determination in the entire economy, and non-unionized employees are generally 
offered the union bargained rates. They also argued that standardization of wage rates 
across occupations is common. Moreover, wage settlements obtained by a union 
influence subsequent wage changes for non-unionized employees or employees 
belonging to other unions. Therefore, if spillover and standardization effects are 
sufficiently strong, lower union-nonunion differences are expected. 
The second means by which unions can affect non-union wages that Lewis identified is 
the “threat effect”, which results from a desire by non-union employers to avoid 
unionization by providing higher wages to their workers (Rosen, 1969; Pencavel, 1972; 
Lazear, 1983; Podgursky, 1986). To this end, Belman and Voos (1993) confirmed that 
non-union workers in more unionised markets earn higher wages, meaning that 
employers are willing to raise non-union employees’ wages to discourage unionization. 
Farber (2005) presents an analysis of the threat effects of unions in the private sector, 
and he finds some evidence that wages of non-union employees are positively affected 
by the threat of union organization. A union’s relative bargaining power is greater 
where the union has a larger share of workers as members. Union workers may earn 
more where legislation makes unions stronger and more secure. Slightly paradoxically, 
non-union workers may earn more as non-union employers attempt to forestall union 
organization (Mastekaasa, 1993). 
Likewise, Card (1991) found that if a strong core of workplaces was unionized, non-
union employers would frequently meet union standards, or at least improve their 
compensation and labor practices beyond what they would have provided if there was 
no union presence. In other words, unions often play a significant role in improving 
minimum standards for all employees by setting a pay standard that non-union 
employers often follow. Based on his analysis of union/non-union wage differentials in 
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Australia, between 1993 - 2001, Waddoups (2005) claims this is particularly the case 
where there are skill shortages. That is, in tight labor markets, the union rate is more 
likely to have a strong influence on pay and other employment conditions employers 
with non-unionized employees would need to offer in order to attract staff. Findings 
such as these point to the conclusion that the “threat effect” typically dominates over the 
“spillover effect”, especially in highly unionized markets where the demand for skilled 
workers is likewise high. 
Other studies have also identified labor demand and unemployment as important 
influences on the union/non-union differential. Blanchflower (1997) and Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1994) argued that, when unemployment is low (high), union wage premia 
appear to be low (high). This research also suggests that the union wage differential is 
positively correlated with the unemployment rate. This is because union wages are less 
responsive to change in the unemployment rate than non-union wages. Blanchflower 
and Bryson (2004), who updated Freeman and Medoff’s earlier 1984 study, found that, 
in the US, variation in industry-level union wage premia remained; that state-level 
union premia varied less than occupation and industry-level premia. They stated that 
when there is strong labour demand, workers tend to organize less and there is less need 
for using union power to negotiate higher wages. However, where there are 
unfavourable working conditions, covered workers might be able to get higher wages, at 
the same time creating unemployment or worse working conditions for non-covered 
employees. Therefore, we should expect wider gaps between union and non-union 
wages when unemployment is high. Public sector wage premia also remained 
substantial and its magnitude was similar to those in the private sector. They also 
pointed out that collective agreements are longer term than individual contracts 
resulting in union wages responding to economic changes with a lag. 
In New Zealand, however, there are employees who are union members but who are not 
covered by collective agreements, contrary to the more common occurrence in other 
countries (e.g., USA and Canada). Therefore, in New Zealand, the differential should be 
more precisely called the “collective versus individual” wage differential. In this regard, 
Peetz (2001) finds that Australian employees on collective agreements often experience 
inferior terms and conditions to employees on individual contracts, in fact having a 
“non-union premium”. He argues that, employers may offer employees a higher wage 
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through individual bargaining for the same type of work, in order to induce employees 
to forsake union coverage – “threat effect”. 
The union/non-union differential is yet to be calculated in New Zealand. Most of the 
literature that has been reviewed for this study has concentrated on union wage effects 
in other countries and mainly in the private sector, since most studies have examined the 
union/non-union wage differential in the private sector. However, only few such studies 
looked at the public sector and public service, in particular. Given the growing 
importance of the public sector’s unionism, more studies are expected to be done in the 
future. 
Studies of the public sector generally focus on the differences in the union-nonunion 
wage differential between the public and private sectors. Hansen (1998), for instance, 
found that the union advantage was larger for private sector employees than for those in 
the public sector. The union wage differential is large enough in most industries to 
encourage workers towards organization, and benefits under union contracts are 
generally superior to benefit packages for non-union workers. Schwenk (1996) found a 
decline in the union/non-union wage differential and the difference of occupational 
composition of union and non-union workers is one of the factors contributing to that 
outcome. White-collar workers are more likely to be non-union and blue-collar workers 
are more likely to be unionized. For one, in most countries, white-collar unions are quite 
a recent phenomenon, whereas blue-collar unions have been around for a much longer 
period. Therefore, blue-collar unions have had much more time to build their strength 
and to influence wage levels.  
Some studies include the effects of unions and union bargaining power as explanatory 
variables for the public/private wage differential. Smith (1977), focusing on the US, 
reported significant positive union wage premium for both males and females employed 
by local government and for females employed by state government. Male state 
government and all federal government employees failed to earn a significant union 
wage premium. Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) found small differences in union wage 
gaps for nonwhites compared to whites in both private and public sector in US. They 
also argued that, wage gaps in the public sector are higher for women for than for men.  
There seems to be a consensus in the US and Canadian public/private sector wage 
differential literature that the union differential is lower in the public sector, and more 
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specifically in central government, than in the private sector (Freeman and Medoff, 
1984; Robinson and Tomes, 1984; Simpson, 1985; Moore and Raisian, 1987; Gyourko 
and Tracy, 1988; Robinson, 1995 and Bender, 1998). Kornfield’s (1993) study of 
Australian union wage premiums also found that the union premium exists primarily in 
the private sector, and he concludes that unions in Australia tend to raise wages more or 
less equally for all employees in the public sector. Gunderson et al (2000), after 
controlling for other determinants of wages, estimated that Canadian public sector 
employees covered by collective agreements earn 8 percent more than those not 
covered, which is in the range of the average union impact in Canada’s public sector. 
These researchers found that wages rise consistently with establishment size: being 19 
percent higher in establishment of 500 and more, compared to establishments of fewer 
than 20. Hence, they identified establishment size as a significant factor to the union-
nonunion differential. They also found that there is a higher degree of unionization in 
the public sector than in the private sector and that, in general, unions tend to increase 
wages for all workers. 
Regardless of a few issues with applying private sector methodologies to public sector 
data, Belman, Heywood and Lund (1997), in their study on earnings and the extent of 
unionization in the public sector in US, confirmed that the scope and structure of private 
sector unionization may be a determinant of public sector wages, as well as of public 
sector unionization and public sector bargaining structure. Similarly, Blanchflower and 
Bryson (2004) argued that most of the public sector experience and, more precisely, pay 
setting procedures follow the private sector. Farber (2005), though, distinguished 
between the organizational structures that unions operate under in the private and public 
sector in US, stating that unions operate in a very decentralized environment in the 
private sector, but not, for the most part, in the public sector. 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, in the New Zealand public service, the 
bargaining structure, since the 1991, has been highly decentralized, with bargaining 
taking place on a department-by-department basis. With the bargaining being delegated 
to departments, it is now managed by departments in accordance with the bargaining 
parameters issued by the Government. The state sector relies on the same guidelines to 
develop pay setting procedures as the private sector. Therefore, a summary of studies in 
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the private sector is essential to the complete discussion of the union/non-union wage 
differential in the New Zealand public service. 
Upon closer inspection of the public and private sectors in other national contexts, the 
majority of studies conclude that unions tend to negotiate higher wages for their 
members. However, some studies show that non-union members earn more than their 
union counterparts. Further to this, Freeman and Medoff (1984), in their seminal book 
‘What do unions do?’,, claim that unions do not raise the wages of all workers by the 
same percentage. They argued that the union wage effect in the US differs significantly 
among workers, depending on their demographic characteristics and the occupation 
and industry in which they are employed. Nevertheless, in general, unions do not only 
raise wages for their members, but they also hold policies that require employers to 
provide “equal pay for equal work”. This typically requires management to ignore skill 
differences across individuals and apply standard rate across all workers. Pay equity 
policies are most prevalent in the public sector. By equalizing pay, unions’ policies raise 
the pay of otherwise lower-paid (less skilled) workers more than otherwise higher-paid 
workers. Accordingly, one expects larger union/non-union differentials for lower paid 
demographic groups.  
Comparing workers’ wages by age, tenure, occupation, industry, race, sex, and firm 
size, Freeman and Medoff found that the union wage effect is the largest for the 
youngest workers, who are typically the lowest paid, and the least for prime-aged 
workers, who are typically the highest paid. A similar pattern was found by tenure, with 
the union/non-union wage differential being the largest for those with the least amount 
of service, who are again among of the lowest paid. By race, the union wage effect is 
larger for non-whites than for whites. Also a strong correlation has been recognized 
between tenure, race and age. For employees with the least amount of service, non-
whites and young people, unions are able to negotiate higher gains. Further, the research 
cited by Freeman and Medoff identified that even though males already earn more than 
females due to other factors (e.g., experience and job tenure), unions raise male wages 
more than female wages, even after holding constant these other effects. Focusing on 
occupation, the authors note that unions typically win larger gains for blue-collar than 
for white-collar workers. At the same time, union wage differentials fall with firm-level 
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vs. industry-level agreements (e.g., suggesting a negative effect of decentralized 
bargaining) and size of the work site. 
Lewis (1986) concluded that, for men and women, the estimates were the same size. 
Mulvey (1986), in his study of unionism in Australia, emphasizes the differential impact 
of gender on the union/non-union wage differential. He found that male union members 
received 9.6 percent higher wages than their non-union counterparts, while female 
members received 7.4 per cent higher wages. The union wage effects also varied 
according to personal and job characteristics, occupation and industry. More highly 
educated, male, non-union workers, for example, received higher wages than their union 
equivalents, effectively creating a negative union differential.   
Cristie (1992) identified occupational status as one of the explanatory variables behind 
the union wage premium in Australia. Peetz (2001), in his comparison of individual 
contracts and collective bargaining in Australia, determined that many employees on 
individual contracts are senior managerial and other senior staff. Consequently, many 
employees on individual contracts have high earnings because of their occupational 
position, and this distorts any comparison between workers on individual contracts and 
other workers. Occupational status, level of seniority (manager, worker) and gender are 
highly correlated. Senior or managerial employees are likely to be highly educated 
males on individual agreements and therefore earn more than their union equivalents. 
Hansen (1998), among others, reported that union membership and the union/non-union 
earnings ratio was greater among men than women and higher among blacks than either 
whites or Hispanics. Workers aged 35 to 64 are more likely to be members of unions 
than either younger or older individuals. Full-time workers are more than twice likely to 
be union members than part-timers. He points out that geographic and other 
demographic differences may account for part of the gap. To this end, analyzing data 
for union members in similar jobs and with equal job experience and similar 
demographic characteristics showed that, union members earn more than their non-
union counterparts.  
Hirsch and Macpherson (2001), examining changes in union wage effects by industry, 
found evidence that union members earn more even after statistically holding constant 
years of schooling, years of potential experience and its square, marital status, race, 
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gender, part-time work, region, broad industry and broad occupation. Examining union 
wages and union membership in the private sector in the US, they found that average 
hourly earnings for union members are higher than for those who are not members. Part 
of the difference they explained by different stocks of human capital or skills, on the 
part of the two populations. Another part reflects different opportunities related to 
labour market location and the personal characteristics of employees. However, even 
after controlling for numerous observed wage-related worker attributes, economists 
typically find that union workers earn more. 
An almost universal finding of the literature is that union/non-union wage differentials 
are larger for lower skilled than for higher-skilled workers (Johnson & Youmans, 1971; 
Ashenfelter, 1978; Freeman, 1980, 1982; Lewis, 1986; Card, 1996; Mishel & Walters 
2003).  Freeman (1980) has argued that unions standardize wages by decreasing 
differentials across and within job positions, so that low-skilled workers receive a large 
premium relative to their alternative non-union wage (Freeman 1980, 1982). Lewis 
(1986) provides a survey, concluding that union wage gaps decrease with occupational 
skill level and schooling (pp.128-31, 136-39). Card’s (1991) research showed that in the 
US unions raise wages more at the bottom and in the middle of the wage scale than at 
the top and that the union wage premium was far greater among low-wage workers than 
among middle or the highest wage workers.  
In his later studies, using longitudinal analysis from a 1987/88 CPS panel of male 
workers, Card (1996), in his comparison across all sectors, arrives at the conclusion that 
all worker OLS wage level and longitudinal union/non-union wage differential 
estimates are similar, and that there exists positive selection among workers with lower 
measured skill and negative selection among those with higher measured skill. He also 
concludes that long-term union wage effects decline with skill level. Following these 
arguments, Mishel and Walters (2003) have pointed out that unions raise wages more 
for low and middle wage workers than for higher wage workers, more for blue-collar 
than for white-collar workers, and more for workers who have less than a college 
degree.  
Hirsh and Shumacher (1998), conducting longitudinal analysis using 1989/90-1994/95 
CPS across skill groups, have provided a careful examination of union wage effects and 
skills using longitudinal analysis from a 1989/90- 1994/95 CPS matched panels. In 
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contrast to Card, the authors concluded that union wage effects are remarkably similar 
across workers with different measured levels of skills. Their results cast some doubt on 
the thesis that unions both seek and acquire larger proportional wage gains for low-skill 
members rather than for high-skill members.  
There is a considerable body of econometric evidence concerning the relationship 
between union wages and union membership. In industries in which a larger percent of 
the workforce is organized, union workers have been found to earn more relative to 
non-union workers (Belman and Voos, 1993). Hirsch (2004) argued that, in the public 
sector, density is much higher than in private sector. However, Freeman and Medoff 
(1984) claimed that union density does not have any impact on union workers, implying 
that union/non-union wage differential grows with the percentage of the industry that is 
organized.  
Wooden (2000) has also shown that, in Australia, strong union presence -where the 
majority of workers are covered by collective agreements - confers a wage advantage in 
the order of 15 to 17 percent, which applies to members and non-members alike.  In 
contrast, union wage effects are small and insignificant at workplaces where collective 
agreements have not been negotiated. Peetz (2001:437) has pointed that, in voluntarist 
regimes, collective bargaining is strengthened when union density is higher; but while it 
is possible in many regimes to have union members who are not covered by collective 
bargaining, in such circumstances unions are largely ineffective in achieving gains for 
their members.  
In more recent research, Waddoups (2005) suggested that, where union density is high, 
it is likely that the provisions of negotiated collective agreements will extend to similar 
non-unionized employees. In his findings, both union membership and union density 
have an impact on the wages and of all workers, both union and non-union. Workers 
receive a premium for union membership, though, and the union premium is higher in a 
high-density industry.  
Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) suggest that the relationship between union density 
and union wages depends on the level of density. They argue that a strong effect is 
achieved when density is higher than 40 percent. Other research indicates that falling 
union density in the US over the period from 1979 to 1996 has been accompanied by a 
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decline in the union wage premium (Belman and Voos 2004). These findings not 
withstanding, Card (2001) suggests that, in spite of falling union density in the US, 
union/non-union wage differentials covering the period from 1973 to 1993 have been 
largely unchanged (Card, 2001).  
Although research has established that unionized workers in industrialized countries 
generally enjoy higher wages than their non-union counterparts, the magnitude of union 
wage premium varies from country to country, as well as across sectors, demographic 
groups, periods of time. There is a wide range of estimates for Australia, varying 
between 3-18 percent (Cristie, 1992; Kornfeld, 1993; Miller & Mulvey, 1994, 1996; 
Miller, Mulvey & Neo, 1999). The most recent study puts the union/non-union net wage 
differential between 1-6 percent (Wooden 2001), using various assumptions for union 
activities.Park (1991) estimated, in South Korea, a differential of 4.2 percent for men 
and 5 percent for women. Wagner (1991) found, in Germany, significant positive union 
effects for blue-collar workers. Schmidt (1995) found a significant wage differential of 
just under 6 percent. Neither Schmidt nor Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) were able 
to find evidence of significant union wage gaps for men in Germany. For Sweden, Le 
Grand (1989) reports a union/non-union difference of only 2 percent, whereas Kalleberg 
and Colbjornsen (1989) found a 16 percent difference in their Swedish data. The net 
union wage premium in the US has been estimated in the range of 15-20 percent (Hirsch 
& Schumacher, 2001; Blanchflower & Bryson, 2004). In the UK, the net union wage 
premium amounted to around 5 percent (Metcalf et.al, 2001). In Canada, most recent 
estimates put the gross union wage differential at 14 percent and the adjusted 
differential at 7 percent (Fang and Verma, 2002).   
 
4.2. New Zealand public service context 
 
As mentioned prior, due to data constraints in NZ, the union wage premium is yet to be 
calculated for the NZ public service. However, Blanchflower (1996), in his report on 
the role of trade unions in the United States compared to eighteen other OECD 
countries using micro-data at the level of the individual, presented an estimated union 
wage gap for New Zealand’s labour market as a whole at 8.4 percent. In the same study, 
it was also found that unions do much better within centralized as opposed to 
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decentralized wage setting systems. In a centralized system, the same rules apply to all 
workplaces, highly unionized or low unionized, with a shift to a single bargaining the 
rules have changed. As it is described in details in the previous chapter, NZ public 
service today operates in a very decentralized environment, which weakens the role of 
unions in the bargaining system and pay-fixing procedures in particular.  
 
4.3. Outlines of the literature review 
 
Relative to the large number of empirical studies that have been done on the wage 
differential, the theoretical area is rather undeveloped. In fact, none of the studies 
reviewed here offers any formal theoretical model or explanation why the wage gap 
between private and public sectors exists. Most decomposition studies attribute the 
differential between different levels of personal and job characteristics, industry and 
firm related features. 
Moore and Raisian (1991) propose other reasons for the differential. The first is the 
theory of compensating differentials. However, they discount this explanation, since 
public sector workers tend to get better wages and fringe benefits than their private 
sectors counterparts. They also discuss the proposition that the premia are due to skill 
differentials which, in the long run, should be (according to neoclassical economic 
theory) the only reason for wage differentials. Fogel and Lewin (1974), by examining 
the US Government, conclude that the government uses the highest wages since they 
must offer the higher wage to attract workers who would otherwise choose a private 
sector job (i.e., a compensating differential). Also, the lower end occupations might 
receive higher wages if it is government policy to increase wages of low skilled 
individuals  (e.g., pay equity policies). 
In summary, the literature shows that in most instances union workers receive higher 
pay than comparable non-union workers; however, there is considerable diversity in 
union wage-gap estimates across individuals, sectors and bargaining structures. The 
following factors have been identified in contributing to the size of union/non-union 
wage differential: union density (the proportion of workers in an industry who report 
union membership), collective bargaining coverage, size of establishment, age, gender, 
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industry, occupation, education, region, term of agreement, ethnicity, marital status, 
tenure with current employer and in a given occupation, and demand for labour.  
The following factors, out of all the identified contributing factors in the literature are 
used in this study: Size of establishment, age, gender, occupation, region, term of 
agreement, ethnicity, and tenure with current employer.  
Due to data constrains, the remaining factors are not included in the analyses. The 
implications of this omission are detailed in the methodology chapter (chapter 5).  
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5. Methodology framework 
 
5.1. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
Within this chapter, I begin by describing the methodology utilized, followed by 
detailed illustration of the dataset used for this study, limitations of the data, variables 
included in the analyses and some notes to assist with the interpretation. 
 
5.2. Methodology 
 
The SPSS 12 version was used for the data analysis. Cross tabulation tests were 
completed to compare the average collective and individual wage across all available 
employee and employer related characteristics. I used OLS analyses to estimate the 
union/non-union wage differential, using the natural log of the full-time equivalent 
(FTE4) salary as a dependent variable while controlling for the same employee and 
employer related characteristics used in cross tabulation analyses. 
Some researchers use the gross wage difference (i.e., means comparison) between union 
and nonunion workers. However, these do not provide a true picture of the differences 
between comparable workers within comparable workplaces – thus the need to adjust 
the gross wage differential by controlling for other  factors known to influence wages, 
such as gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, term of employment, hours of work, the 
union the employees belong to, tenure and the size of the employer5. A dummy variable 
for type of employment agreement is specified in regressions. This measure reflects two 
categories: individual (between an employee and the employer) or collective agreement 
(between multiple employees and one employer as parties). Employees on current and 
expired collective agreements were aggregated into one category; this was allowed due 
to the fact that, although an agreement has come to an end, employees remain under the 
same terms and conditions till a new agreement is negotiated. A single coefficient, then, 
gives an estimate of the collective/individual differential in wages, controlling for 
observed employee and workplace characteristics. 
                                                 
4 Annual full-time base salary ($) as at June, 2005 
5 The full set of variables and definitions are included in Appendix (1) 
 39
5.3. Data source 
 
This study focuses on identifying the differences in wages that are contained within 
individual and collective agreements in the New Zealand public service.  
For this study, I have used data that mainly comes from the 30 June 2005 Human 
Resource Capability (HRC) data collections for the State Services Commission, which 
gathers anonymous unit record data on all staff in 35 government departments. The core 
government departments are defined in the State Sector Act 1988. While the survey 
includes all permanent and temporary employees, as well as part-time employees, it 
excludes contractors, Chief Executives and employees employed on a casual or as-
required basis. 
The variables included in the analysis are those variables contained within the HRC 
datasets. Each observation is a unique public service employee, adding up to 40,290 
observations in total. Descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix (2). The data are 
used to estimate the extent to which collective bargaining might effectively set pay 
terms and conditions for workers on collectives and individual agreements in the public 
service. 
The Industrial Relations Centre (IRC) database was used in this study to support the 
findings of the SSC survey on public service remuneration systems and to deepen the 
knowledge of the current remunerations systems in terms of union involvement in pay 
fixing procedures and its impact on union members and their non-union counterparts’ 
wages. For the past 14 years, the Industrial Relations Centre at Victoria University has 
surveyed NZ employers and trade unions and requested a copy of each employment 
contract/agreement that has been collectively negotiated. Expired agreements are 
replaced with renegotiated agreements. In this manner, a longitudinal data series was 
established. These encompass the overwhelming majority of employees covered by 
collective agreements in New Zealand. In June 2005, the sample included a complete 
set of public service collective agreements.  
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5.4. Limitations of the data 
 
The SSC survey data, my primary source, have confidentiality protocols, and therefore, 
some of the variables (such as education or skill level, marital status etc.) were removed 
from the set. Also, some reporting such as organization size (bands), age (bands) and 
occupation (2 digit level6), are in aggregated form and individual departments were not 
identified in the dataset used for this study. Other contributing factors identified in the 
literature are simply not collected as part of the HRC report. These include union 
density (the proportion of workers in an organization who report union membership), 
collective bargaining coverage, education, marital status, and demand for labour. This 
leads to potential omitted variable bias, for example, the failure to adequately control 
for workplace factors that may influence wages (especially important in decentralized 
environment). Union density within an organization and the number of CEAs in place in 
each organization allows for determination of the extent of unionization at the level of 
which collective bargaining takes place.  
Education appears in a large number of studies of the union/non-union wage differential 
as an important explanatory factor. However, there is also evidence that education is not  
an important determinant of earnings. Choudhury (1993), for instance, states that “the 
relative unimportance of education in explaining wages lends support to the screening 
hypothesis which states that education does not enhance one’s ability but merely serves 
as a screening mechanism “ (Choudhury, 1993). In addition, an employee’s marital 
status was found to be positively related to unionism in other studies, indicating the 
importance of including it in the equation, if available (Booth and Bryan, 2004). 
 
5.5. Variables used in the analyses 
 
The dependent variable: The natural log of (FTE) annualized salary served as the 
dependent variable in the regression models. Reasons for that are stated below (refer to 
preliminary tests section). The salary information comes from the employing 
department and relates to the employee’s annual base salary on the payroll system. This 
                                                 
6 NZSCO codes are presented in a form of: 1-5 digit levels, with 5 digit level presenting most specific 
occupations. 
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means that additional, “above base” earnings, such as performance pay, bonuses, 
overtime etc, are omitted from the annual salary figures for all employees. 
The predictor variables: Measures of gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, term of 
employment, hours of work, the union the employees belong to, tenure and the size of 
the employer are also specified in the regression models. 
All independent (predictor) variables were dichotomized to simplify the interpretation 
of the results. 
Gap calculations:  By NZ law, only union members can be covered by collective 
agreements, moreover, in practice, only a small portion of union members are employed 
on individual contracts. Therefore, in this context, it makes sense to compare salaries on 
collective agreements versus those on individual agreements. I expect the differential to 
be similar to union/non-union differential, since most unionised employees in NZ are on 
collective agreements and all non-union employees in NZ are on individual agreements. 
I extracted the coefficient on the contract type variable, the coefficient on the contract 
type was then turned into a wage gap taking anti-logs, deducting 1 and multiplying by 
100 to turn the figure into a percentage. 
Model evaluating: Due to the large sample size, both R square and adjusted R square 
are the same values, therefore the adjusted R square values were reported for all models. 
 
5.6. Model fit 
 
I have used regression analysis to produce an equation that will predict a dependent 
variable using one or more independent variables. This equation has the form  
• LnY = B1X1 + B2X2 + ... + A  
where LnY is the natural logarithm of the observed annual salary of an employee 
(salary), X1, X2 and so on are the independent variables that I am using to predict LnY; 
b1, b2 and so on are the predicted coefficients or multipliers that describe the size of the 
effect the independent variables are having on the dependent variable Y; and A is the 
value Y is predicted to have when all the independent variables are equal to zero. 
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Multiple regression finds the set of estimated (estimates of Bn) that provides the best fit 
between the model and the given data.  
Different studies use a wide-range of analyses, such as establishment- level analyses, 
cross-sectional estimates, producing estimates based on longitudinal data. Lewis (1986) 
and Freeman (1984) point out that cross-section and fixed effect estimates or “panel” 
estimates of the impact of unions on wages ”bound the true impact unionism”, whereas 
OLS estimates are less biased. 
 
5.7. Regression diagnostics 
 
Multivariate regression can appear as a fussy tool and is not appropriate for small 
samples where the distribution of scores is very skewed. However, there are also a 
number of other assumptions that should not be violated. These include collinearity, 
outliers, normality, linearity, homoscedastisticity, and independence of residuals 
diagnostics (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). A number of preliminary tests were 
performed prior to proceeding with the analyses. The given set of variables was tested 
for how well it is able to predict the outcome, which variable is the best predictor of the 
outcome, and whether a particular predictor is still able to predict the outcome when the 
effects of another variable is controlled for.  
All regressions conducted for this study include a matrix of individual characteristics 
determining wages, a matrix of some of the workplace characteristics and a dummy 
variable equal to one if individual is covered by a collective and zero otherwise. Only 
one regression (#1) includes both a dichotomous variable equal to one if employee is a 
union member and zero otherwise and the contract type dummy variable. Another 
regression replaces the contract type variable with the union membership variable. The 
equation contains individual variables assumed to influence human capital formation 
(including age, tenure within a department, ethnicity, occupation, hours worked, and 
contract term). It was argued by others that some of these variables are also likely to be 
related to membership status, and so are important controls (Booth and Bryan, 2004). 
Workplace characteristics, such as size and region, were also included in the equation.  
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Regressions # 4 also contains interaction terms with the contract type variable. Table 1 
in Appendix 1 defines the variables.  
 
5.8. Preliminary data tests 
 
Information on the distribution of salaries was obtained (skewness and kurtosis). The 
skewness value provides an indication of the symmetry of the distribution. Kurtosis, on 
the other hand, provides information about the ‘peakedness’ of the distribution. Positive 
skewness values indicate positive skew (salaries clustered to the left at the low value). 
Positive kurtosis values indicate that the distribution is rather peaked (clustered at the 
centre), with long thin tails. However, since the sample is quite large, skewness will not 
‘make a substantive difference in the analysis (Tabachnick&Fidell, 2001, p.74). 
Kurtosis can result in an underestimate of the variance, but again, this risk is also 
reduced due to the large sample (200+ cases: see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, p.75). 
I have also assessed the normality of the distribution of the salaries for both collective 
and individual agreements. I have calculated the 5 percent trimmed mean, to obtain this 
value I have removed the top and bottom 5 percent of my cases to recalculate the means 
and to determine whether or not the more extreme cases are having a strong influence 
on the mean. This was found not to be the case. 
The test of normality showed a significant result (p < .001), where a significance value 
of more than .05 indicates normality. However, this result is quite common in larger 
samples. This does not necessarily indicate a problem, but simply points out that are 
some cases of employees earning higher salaries. 
Homogeneity of variance (Levene test) was performed to test for equality of variances 
of two groups of employees, those employed on collective agreements and those on 
individual agreements (collective and individual). A significant value was obtained 
(1.19), which suggests that variances for the two groups are not equal, and therefore the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated. Provided the size of both groups is 
reasonably similar (e.g. largest/smallest=1.5, Stevens, 1996, p. 249), though, analysis of 
variance is reasonably robust to violations of this assumption.  
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Another major assumption refers to the relationship among the independent variables. 
Two values were examined for collinearity: tolerance and VIF. Tolerance is an indicator 
of how much of the variability of the specific independent is not explained by the other 
independent variables in the model. It is calculated using the formula 1-R (square) for 
each variable. If this value is less than .10, it indicates a high correlation with other 
variables. The VIF (variance inflation factor) is the inverse of the tolerance value (1 
divided by tolerance). VIF values above 10 would be a concern, indicating 
multicollinearity. Both values for all variables are high, indicating that the 
multicollinearity assumption was not violated. It is not surprising, given that the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the variables were not high.  
Union membership and contract type value did not exceed those commonly used cut-off 
points, however the correlation coefficient is still quite high (0.7), therefore I had one of 
the highly intercorrelated independent variable removed from the analyses (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2001). 
As described in detail in other sections, only union members in New Zealand’s public 
service are covered by collective agreements; therefore it made sense to omit union 
membership from most of the analyses. Moreover, no major problems with the data or 
using these multiple regressions were identified. However, the set of data values is 
skewed to the right, indicating that regression diagnostics are worse when the 
untransformed salary variable is used. Accordingly, the transformed (natural log) of 
annualized salary (FTE) was taking value to result in a data set that is roughly 
symmetric and often roughly normal. The t-tools work best with symmetric, roughly 
normal populations. Thus, it is often better to analyze the natural logarithms of the data 
values rather than the raw data when the raw data are right skewed. 
For most analyses, standard multiple regressions were used to estimate the 
collective/individual wage differential. The results are presented in the Appendix 2. 
 
5.9. Relationships between the variables 
 
Correlation tests were used to explore the nature and strength of relationships between 
the variables. The relationship between the variables was investigated using Pearson 
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product-moment correlation coefficient. Table 3 in Appendix 2 summarizes these 
findings. 
A significant relationship was found between the salary variable and each of the 
independent variables (p < 0.01), indicating that each variable explains some percentage 
of the variance in employees’ salary, although some of these correlations may be 
spurious.  In addition, the size and the direction of the correlation vary across the 
variables. Different authors suggest different interpretations of the strength of these 
relationships. I followed Cohen’s guidelines7 to determine the strength of the 
relationship. There was a medium-size negative correlation between salary and 
occupation: (r = -.424, n = 40,290, p < 0.01), meaning that occupation helps to explain 
18 percent of the variance in employees wage rates. The contract type, organization size 
and union membership variables explain 8, 6 and 5 percent of the variance in 
employees’ wage rates, with (r = 0.284, n = 40,290, p < 0.01, r = 0.241, n = 40,290, p < 
0.01 and r = 0.231, n = 37,539, p < 0.01), respectively. A similar size positive 
relationship between those variables indicates that salaries are higher on individual 
contracts and for non-union members. The larger the organization is, the higher the 
salary. Age and tenure each has a small positive correlation with the salary variable, 
implying that, salary increases as age and department tenure increases (r = .217, n = 
40,290, p = 0.01; r = 0.183, n = 40,290, p < 0.01). 
Union membership and contract type were found to be highly correlated (r = 0.8, n = 
23,281, p< .0005), indicating that 64 percent of the variance in employees being on one 
contract type or the other is explained by them belonging to a union or not. Therefore, 
due to multicollinearity, I have removed the union membership dummy variable from 
any further analysis. Nevertheless, this result was expected, since in line with New 
Zealand legislation, only union members are covered by collective agreements and only 
a small portion of union members are on individual agreements.  
It was also observed that the union membership status of an employee has very little 
effect on the strength of the relationship between contract type and salary in regressions 
including both the union membership and contract type dummy variables. In other 
words, even if an employee on individual agreement is a union member, due to his/her 
ideological beliefs towards unions, that belief does not affect his/her salary (tested by 
                                                 
7 R= (-or +).10 to .29 – small; r = (- or +).30 to .49 – medium; r = (- or +).50 to 1 - large 
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partial correlation, controlling for union membership). In most industrial countries, 
coverage8 and membership9 are less highly correlated because there is less pressure on 
employees to become members where there is a coverage agreement (Hildreth, 2000). 
In NZ it is a law that only union members get coverage. 
Further examining the coefficients, it was also found that employees on collective 
agreements seem to have more experience, be employed as permanent staff, work in 
larger organizations, in blue-collar occupations and earn lower salaries than employees 
on individual agreements. Also, unionization seems to be positively related to employer 
size: the larger the employer, the higher the ratio of employees on collectives. There 
seems to be a strong correlation between age and being on collectives, as well as 
between tenure and unionization. This means that, the older a person is, the more 
likelihood he/she is on a collective. The same applies to tenure: the more tenure a 
person has, the more likely she/he would be unionized.  All of these factors suggest that 
the negative simple correlation, between union membership (or contract coverage) and 
pay may be misleading, and that this relationship may be mitigated by some indirect 
effects through intervening variables. 
Occupation is defined based on the New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupation 
at the two-digit level. The occupational composition of the public service differs 
markedly from the NZ labour market as a whole. Seventy-five percent of public 
servants are in the professional or clerical and administration occupation groups, 
compared with 31percent in these groups for the labour market as a whole. All 
occupations that were employed in the NZPS at the time of the survey were included in 
the analyses, with some changes to the legislators, administrators and managers groups. 
These occupations contain two main groups of people: Chief Executives and diplomatic 
representatives. Due to confidentiality protocols and the fact that collective bargaining 
plays no role in their pay settings, Chief Executives have been removed from the data. 
Ethnic categories in the survey include: NZ Maori; NZ European; Pacific Islands; 
Asian, Non-NZ European, other ethnicity and unknown. Term of employment includes 
two categories: (1) fixed – limited (contract/agreement with a specified end date) and 
(2) open (permanent employee).  Hours of work differentiates between full time 
employees who work more than 30 hours per week and part-time employees with less 
                                                 
8 Employees who are covered by collective agreements  
9 Employees who are union members 
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than 30 hours per week. Age, employer size and tenure are described in categories. 
Tenure is measured within a department. For age, a mid point was calculated for each 
category (band). Again, all variables on the right-hand side of these regressions are 
specified as dummy variables. 
 
5.10. Setting the scene 
 
In 2005, 21,878 (54%) employees of the New Zealand public service were employed on 
collective agreements, compared to 18,412 (46%) being employed on individual 
agreements. In line with the a priori expectations, the minimum wage rate for a full time 
employee on collective agreement is slightly higher ($20,857 per annum), compared to 
the minimum wage rate on individual agreement ($17,791 per annum). However, 
looking at the maximum wage rate, it is the other way around: individual agreements 
offer much higher salary ($309,850) than do collective agreements ($182,000).  
These findings are expected, since many employees on individual agreements are senior 
managerial and other senior staff; consequently, many employees on individual 
contracts have high earnings because of their occupational position. Also, it supports the 
hypothesis that unions improve minimum standards, creating larger gaps for lower 
income levels. Average collective agreement earnings for both full-time and part-time 
employees is $44,561, compared to average individual agreement earnings of $57,971, 
bringing the non-collective wage premium to 23 percent. This result was estimated by 
simple comparison of means, without controlling for differences in individual, job, 
workplace and regional characteristics. In addition, the income disparity on individual 
agreements is substantially larger than it is on collective agreements; once again, this 
difference can be attributed to occupations. Union members are likely to be labourers, 
associate professionals, clerks and trade workers (occupations that earn around the 
average salary) and less likely to be managers or professionals.   
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6. Findings 
6.1. Introduction to the Chapter 
In this chapter, I first provide the descriptive statistics of the data. I then carry out basic 
comparisons of union/non-union wages by gender, employment type, occupation, 
ethnicity, age, employer size and tenure. These are followed by multivariate analyses of 
the dependent variable (salary) while controlling for gender, employment type, 
occupation, ethnicity, age, employer size and tenure.  
 
6.2. Research Purpose 
 
The union/non-union differential has been calculated many times before, by a great 
number of researchers, using a wide range of data sets across many countries. However, 
due to data limitations, the union premium not previously been  calculated for the New 
Zealand public service. New Zealand State Services Commission’s Human Resources 
Capability Survey (NZ SSC HRC) is the only available local source of individual level 
information on collective agreement coverage and union membership. This research 
seeks differences between collective and individual wages using the NZ SSC HRC. My 
aim is to 1) explore what variables contribute to pay differences between union and 
nonunion employees in the public service and 2) to evaluate the impact of employee’ 
and employer’ specific characteristics on the collective premium, if one exists. 
In order to achieve these objectives, I 1) carry out basic comparisons of the average 
collective and individual wage by looking at the raw gaps across gender, employment 
type, occupations, ethnicity, age, employer size and tenure, 2) work out the contributing 
factors through a numerous sets of multivariate regressions, and 3) analyse the results in 
the unique NZ context to allow new ideas and theories to emerge and to compare them 
to international trends. 
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6.3. Dataset characteristics 
 
Table 1 in Appendix 1 contains the descriptives for all the variables used in this 
research.  The full set contains 40,290 public servants. In this sample, 54 percent are 
employed on collective agreements while around 58 percent are union members. Public 
service is dominated by female employees (59%). Asians is the smallest, however the 
fastest growing ethnic group of all (5%), followed by Pacific Islanders (7%). Maori 
represent 18 percent and 75 percent of core government employees identified 
themselves as NZ Europeans. The vast majority (90%) of the workforce is permanent 
staff and work full-time. More than 84 percent of the public service employees are 
employed by large organizations with 1000 or more employees. The largest 
occupational group is associate professionals (36.6%) followed by professionals 
(29.2%). Clerks constitute 17.5 percent of the workforce, while corporate managers 
represent 9.7 percent. The bulk of the employees are in the 30-50 age group. Almost 21 
percent of the workforce has less than 1 year of service (within the Department) and 28 
percent has only 1 to 3 years of service. Thus, almost half of the public service 
employees have limited experience gained within an organization, while less than 30 
percent has more than 10 years of service, indicating high staff turnover. Not 
surprisingly, a large percent of employees are based in Wellington (NZ capital) versus 
less than 1 percent being employed overseas (mainly diplomats). Virtually the same 
proportion of employees works in Auckland (20.3%) as in the rest of the North Island 
(22.5%) or the South Island (16.5%). 
 
6.4. Unionization 
 
Slightly more women (55%) are employed on collective agreements than men (53.2%). 
Unionization seems to focus on permanent employees, as 58 percent of them are on 
collective agreements, compared to only 16 percent being fixed term employees. Union 
members are employed on both collective and individual agreements. Nearly 18 percent 
of union members are on individual agreements, with a large proportion of them 
belonging to Public Service Association, indicating that there is more to unions than just 
their ability to raise their members’ economical conditions. Some people choose to be a 
union member out of their ideological beliefs in the role of unions, the importance of 
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their existence and the impact they have on the society10, as well as using their 
membership as an “insurance policy”. In the NZ public service, as discussed in chapter 
2, senior management and other senior staff were pushed out of collective bargaining; 
however some of these employees retained their union membership under the SSA 
1988.  
Around 55 percent of full-time employees and nearly 51 percent of part-time employees 
are on collective agreements. The unionization rate for Pacific Islanders and Maori is 64 
percent and 61 percent, respectively, followed by Asians and NZ Europeans with 55 
percent and 53 percent, respectively. The former findings are remarkably similar to the 
overall unionization rate of the public service workforce (54%). PSA is the largest 
union in the sector, representing 76 percent of union members, whereas slightly over 15 
percent of them are hired on individual agreements. The remaining 3 percent of union 
members covered by individual agreements belong to a number of small occupation-
related unions that operate within the public service.  
Looking at the various occupations, the “other workers” category which mainly 
contains tradespeople is most organized (74%), followed by associated professionals 
(66%) and clerical and administrative workers (64%). As expected in the NZ context, 
corporate managers is the group with the least coverage, as one in five corporate 
mangers is on a collective, however nearly 40 percent of them are union members. This 
is still considered a high ratio considering the concentrated efforts by various 
governments to push corporate managers to individual contracts since the inception of 
state sector reforms in the late 1980s. Differences in unionization rates among the 
various occupational groups might also reflect a negative relationship between job 
responsibilities and being on a collective. Legislators and administrators is another 
group of workers with a low collective coverage, however the unionization rate is 
extremely high (75%). Even though, due to data aggregation, there is no way of 
distinguishing between legislators and administrators; it is more likely that 
administrators would be the ones that are employed on collectives and not legislators.  
                                                 
10 A full discussion on reasons for joining a union is beyond the scope of this study. 
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6.5. Analyses 
 
Mean wages 
Table 2 in Appendix 2 reports the mean salaries and mean raw wage differentials 
between collective and individual agreements by gender, agreement term, union 
membership, hours of work, employer size, occupation, age, employer tenure and 
ethnicity.  
On average, NZ public service employees on collective agreements earn 23 percent less 
than those employed on individual contracts. Positive collective premiums were found 
for workers under 20 years of age (8%), teaching professionals (51.2%), the lowest paid 
professional occupation, and “other workers” (labourers and trade people) (1.2%). The 
highest wage differential was found for teaching professionals (51.2%), the lowest 
earners out of all professionals, with 50 percent of them covered by collectives. 
Labourers and tradespeople are the lowest earners of all occupations, (1.2%) with 74 
percent of the employees covered by collective agreements. These findings are in line 
with the findings of a large body of previous research (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; 
Card, 1991; Mishel and Walters, 2003). 
Occupation 
Further, looking at the data by occupation, large negative differentials are shown for 
diplomats (34%), corporate managers (36%), followed by professionals: life science & 
health professionals (20%), other professionals (15%) and physical, mathematical & 
engineering science professionals (13%). Professionals are the largest occupational 
group in the NZ public service and are international dominated due to skill shortages. 
For these occupations, global market forces set the floor for public sector wages, since 
public sector employers must compete with the local private sector and, in some cases, 
international markets to attract highly qualified employees (Gunderson, 1978a and 
1979). The associate professionals (4%) and clerks (4%) had modest negative union 
premiums. In the white-collar occupations, the size of the differential seems to be 
related to the level of responsibility required for the job. This is in line with the findings 
of Peetz (2001), who also found that, in Australia, employees on individual agreements 
earn more than those on collectives and linked this to occupational differences. Many 
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previous studies have also shown larger union gains for blue-collar workers than for 
white-collar workers (Card, 1991; Mishel and Walters, 2003), and this is substantiated 
in the NZ public service as well. These findings seem to follow a large number of 
studies where the union/non-union wage differentials were found to be larger for lower 
skilled workers than for higher skilled workers. (Johnson and Youmans, 1971; 
Ashenfelter, 1978; Freeman, 1980; 1982; Lewis, 1986; Card, 1996; Mishel and Walters, 
2003). The twist in the NZ public service results is that most lower-skilled employees 
on collectives still earn less than their counterparts on individual contracts, however the 
negative differential is smaller for the lower-skilled occupational groups than for the 
higher-skilled ones. At the same time, union density within an occupation group might 
also be related to the size of the union/non-union wage differentials by occupation, as 
labourers and trades people, associate professionals, and clerks are all highly unionized.     
Gender 
In terms of gender, males on collective agreements earn 30 percent less than males on 
individual contracts, while for females, the negative union differential is smaller: at 17 
percent. This is contrary to the findings of the literature, as usually unions provide 
greater gains for males, who already earn higher wages, than for females (Mulvey, 
1986). However, traditionally, unions were male-dominant, and that would explain why 
other research found unions more effective in negotiating higher earnings for their male 
members. Some studies, nevertheless, have shown a positive union premium for 
females in the state and local government, failing to do so for males (Smith, 1977). 
Lewis (1986), for instance, concluded that, for men and women, the estimates were the 
same. At this stage, I can only speculate about the reasons for the significant difference 
in the differential by gender. One of the contributing factor might be the occupational 
composition across genders, with females congregating in lower paid occupations and 
males more typically holding more senior and managerial positions, which command 
higher salaries. At the same time, senior and/or managerial employees are more likely to 
be employed on individual agreements. I, further on, undertake multivariate analyses to 
either support or refute these findings. 
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Organization size 
Focusing on employer size, the smaller the organization is, the larger the negative union 
premium. Within organizations with less than 200 workers, employees on collective 
agreements earn 28 percent less than employees on individual agreements; virtually the 
same differentials were found for employees working in medium size (200-999) and big 
organizations (over 1000) (-21.1% versus - 20.8%).  This might be related to union 
representation, though, as smaller organizations have much lower union density than 
larger ones.  
Age and department tenure 
Looking at the size of the differential by age, it has been established in the literature that 
the union wage effect is the largest for the youngest workers and the smallest for prime 
aged workers (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The findings of this study are consistent 
with those results. Although a negative union wage differential exists for all age groups 
(except for employees younger than 20 years old), it is the smallest for those between 
20 and 24 years old (2 %), steadily increasing till the age 55-59 group (32%), and then 
slowly decreasing to a (-18%) for the 65+ age group. Tenure follows the same pattern, 
although the differences between the various groups are less pronounced: employees 
with less than one year of service on collectives earn (24%) less than employees with 
longer than 10 years of service, who earn (34%) less on collectives than on individual 
contracts. 
Term 
In reference to term of agreements, employees in permanent positions who are 
employed collective agreements earn (26%) less than their counterparts on individual 
agreements. In comparison, employees on fixed-term agreements, who are covered by 
collective agreements, earn (14%) less than employees on collectives. 
Permanent and part-time workers 
The gap also varies by hours worked. Part-time employees on individual agreements 
earn higher salaries than their counterparts on collective agreements, however, the 
differential is more moderate than for full time employees (6.3% versus 24.6%). 
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Regional variation  
Disregarding the “overseas and missing occupation” group, Wellington has the highest 
negative union wage differential (26%). Three other regions also showed a wage gap in 
favour of non-covered workers; however the gaps are more moderate: Auckland (10%), 
Rest of North Island (2%) and South Island (8%).  
Ethnicity 
Finally, by ethnicity, the literature review shows that the union/non-union earnings ratio 
was greater for blacks and Hispanics than for whites, indicating that unions provide 
more gains for groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in the labour market (Hansen, 
1998). This study concurs with those findings, although there is still a negative 
collective premium for both Pakeha and Maori in the NZ public service. However, the 
gap is wider for all ethnic groups in this sample: Pacific Islanders , the most unionized 
ethnic group showed a smaller gap (9.1%) than Maori (18%), Asians (20%), Non-NZ 
European (24%), other ethnic groups (17%), and Pakeha (25%). 
In summary, simple comparisons between the average salary earned on collective 
versus individual agreement across a wide range of contributing factors that were 
identified in the literature review estimated the raw collective/individual wage gap at 
(23%). However, previous research has shown that the union wage gap can be partially 
explained by differences in personal, job and workplace characteristics. Therefore, I 
now turn to multivariate analyses to estimate the adjusted collective wage premium.  
This is done by controlling for most of the independent variables that were recognized 
in previous studies. 
 
6.6. Regressions results 
 
All regression results are presented in Appendix 3. 
Although simple comparisons across all factors show a non-union premium, after 
controlling for numerous observed wage-related worker attributes, economists typically 
find that union workers earn more. 
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Several variations of the standard regression model were used in this study to estimate 
the union/non-union wage differential, including adding interaction terms of each 
variable with the contract type variable. This involves all of the independent variables 
being entered into the equation at once to indicate how well this set of variables is able 
to predict pay levels; as well as to demonstrate how much unique variance each of the 
independent variables explains in the dependent variable, over and above the other 
independent variables included in the set11. 
Regression #1: 
Table 1summaries the results of the regression and the omitted category for each 
variable. In this regression, the union status dummy variable was included despite its 
high correlation with the contract type variable to confirm the decision for it to be 
omitted. Due to previously discussed reasons12, the same coefficients are expected for 
both variables.  
Evaluating the model: 
The model explains 58 percent of the variance in salaries (R square = .580), with the 
model reaching statistical significance at the level of .000.  
The adjustments for personal and workplace characteristics substantially reduced the 
collective/individual wage gap, providing more reliable estimated differentials between 
comparable employees.  
Coefficients 
Employees on individual agreements earn slightly more than their counterparts on 
collective agreements, estimating the non-collective premium at 2.8 percent. At the 
same time, non-union members earnings are 1.7 percent higher compared to union 
members’ earnings. The salaries for men are higher than for women by almost 3 percent. 
                                                 
11 Detailed explanations on the regression models and variables included in the analyses are summarised 
in the methodology section. 
 
12 Only union members are covered by collective agreements and a small portion of union members are 
employed on individual contracts, with their pay being determined by individual bargaining. Moreover, 
preliminary checks revealed that being a union member on an individual agreement did not have any 
impact on the employee’s pay rate. 
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Pacific Islanders earn the lowest salaries of all ethnic groups, while non-NZ Europeans 
earnthe highest salaries. NZ Europeans closely follow this group, which is also the 
largest ethnic group in the public service. The covered/not covered wage differential 
between Asians and Pacific Islanders is small (below 1%), however it is significant at 
level of .004. The “unknown ethnicity”13 employees earn similar wages to Maori 
(b=0.022 and b=0.20, respectively, both significant at the level of less than 1%) relative 
to Pacific Islanders.  
Furthermore, analyzing the results by occupation portrays legislators and 
administrators, which contain a small number of individuals (75 employees – less than 
1%, with the union members placed at the lower end of the pay scale), earn at least 15% 
higher salaries than all other occupations. Corporate managers and all professionals 
(except for teaching professionals) earn from 5 to 15 percent higher salaries compared 
to the omitted category. All the rest of the occupational groups earn substantially less 
than the omitted category (“not specified”). All the results are significant at less than the 
1 percent level.  
Permanent employees earn over 5 percent higher salaries than their counterparts on 
fixed term agreements. However, most of the public service employees are employed on 
permanent agreements. 
The results show that the wage rate increases with job tenure within the department. 
Compared to the most experienced employees (with over 10 years of experience within 
a department), employees with fewer years of service earn less. As expected, the largest 
gap was found among employees with less than one year of service (6.3%), followed 
closely by employees with 2 years of experience (5.1%). Employees with 3 or 4 years of 
experience are earning virtually the same salaries (slightly over 2% less than employees 
with over 10 years of tenure). All the results are significant at 1 percent alpha level. 
The coefficients on the regional variables indicate that, relative to Wellington, salaries 
are lower in Auckland, followed by South Island and the rest of North Island (5.3%, 
6.4% and 6.7%, respectively, at the significant level less than 1%).  
                                                 
13 Includes employees who identify themselves as “New Zealanders” 
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Department size has a negative impact on wage rates. The smaller the size of the 
organization, the higher the wages are. Small (less than 200 employees) and medium 
sized departments (200 thru 999) offer 4 percent and 3 percent, respectively, more to 
their employees than large departments (with over 1000 employees), at a significant 
level of less than 1 percent. 
Finally, full-timers earn almost 1.5 percent (p< .0005) compared to their part-time 
counterparts. 
Regression #2:  
In this regression, the union membership dummy variable was removed from the 
equation, due to its high correlation with the contract type dummy variable.  
Evaluating the model  
As in the previous model, this model explains nearly 58% of the variance in salaries, 
with the model reaching statistical significance at the level of less than 1 percent.  
Coefficients 
Omitting the union variable from the equation has increased the collective vs. individual 
wage differential by less than 1 percent to a negative 3.7 percent, whereas the rest of the 
coefficients remain the same. These findings support the fact that only union members 
are employed on collective agreements and that union members who are employed on 
individual agreements are placed at the lower end of the pay scale. 
Regression #3: 
To support my assumptions in the previous regression (#2), the same exercise was 
performed with the contract type variable being replaced by the union variable.  
Evaluating the model  
This model explains nearly 58% of the variance in salaries, with the model reaching 
statistical significance at the level of less than 1 percent.  
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Coefficients 
Controlling for all the remaining variables, non-union members receive higher salaries 
than their union counterparts. The wage differential is estimated at 3.1 percent, 
remarkably similar to the estimate concluded in regression #2, with the contract type 
variable (3.7%). The rest of the coefficients remained the same. 
Regression # 4: 
In my further analyses  (regressions  #4 and #5), I have adjusted the new premium 
against the premium estimated with a contract type dummy and controls for employee 
and employer characteristics by creating interaction terms of each independent variable 
with the contract type variable.  
Evaluating the model 
As a result, the model’s ability to explain the gap in salaries on collective vs. individual 
agreements increased to nearly 62 percent, with the model reaching statistical 
significance at the level of less than 1 percent, indicating that a relationship existed 
between ln_salaries and all the predictor variables taken together.  
Coefficients 
The collective vs. individual coefficient is insignificant (b= .021, sig. =.113), though, 
indicating that there is no difference between comparable employees on collective 
agreements and individual agreements. These findings confirm the expectation of no 
collective wage effect in the NZPS due to the fact that, despite the legislation forbidding 
free-riding, the terms and conditions of collective agreements are passed on to all 
employees, regardless of their union status. This study confirms the hypothesis that the 
collective wage effect is stronger for women than for men, for blue-collar than for 
white-collar employees. 
In general, a few interaction terms’ coefficients are insignificant.  
Analyzing closely some of the interaction terms, part time employees benefit more from 
being on collective agreements than do full time employees (b= -.023, sig. = .000). 
Permanent employees earn higher salaries than employees on fixed terms (b =.008, sig. 
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= .090). These groups are traditionally high earners.  Moreover, compared to the most 
experienced employees, employees with less than 10 years of service gained a non-
collective premium of between 1percent and 3 percent. Also, large organizations are 
able to offer higher salaries to their employees on collectives than small organization 
(less than 200 employees) (b= -.022, sig. =.013). In line with some of the previous 
findings, female benefit more by being on collective agreements than male (b= -.020, 
sig. =.000). 
Across occupations, the premium is highest (b =.164, sig. = .000) among the 
traditionally low paid occupations within the public service sector. This is confirmed by 
teaching professionals earning significantly higher salaries on collective agreements 
than other occupations. There are small differences in collective wage gaps across all 
regions, with Wellington being an exception to that. Compared to the rest of NZ, the 
wage benefits of collectivism are greater for Auckland, the rest of North Island and 
South Island than Wellington (4.3%, 5.3% and 5.7%, respectively). Also, compared to 
Pacific Islanders, only NZ Europeans are in significant disadvantage by being covered 
by collective agreements (b= -.013, sig. =.000).  
The contract type*age interaction term coefficient shows that, relative to prime-aged 
employees (65 years old or older), there is a collective premium for younger (between 
18 years old and 34, inclusive) workers with the wage gap decreasing as the age 
increases (from 7% to 1%, respectively). Also the level of significance of the results 
changes:  30 thru 34 years old (b=.071, sig. = .000), and 35 thru 39 (b= -.012, sig. 
=.057). The collective wage effect is the largest for the youngest workers, who are the 
lowest paid, and the least or negative for prime-aged workers, who are the highest paid. 
These findings are consistent with international literature. 
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Regression#5  
Due to previously discussed reasons14, I have now omitted senior managerial and other 
senior staff occupations from the equation. These include: legislators and 
administrators, corporate managers and all other professionals. 
Evaluating the model 
The model explains nearly 55 percent of the variance in salaries on collective vs. 
individual agreements, with the model reaching statistical significance at the level of 
less than 1 percent.  
Coefficients 
After removing the mentioned above occupations, the coefficient on the contract type 
variable is now insignificant (b=-.009, sig. =.322), confirming that there is no wage 
differential between employees on collective vs. individual agreements.  
Consequently, the gender coefficient has increased, reaching 5 percent in favour of 
male employees (sig. =.000), and the contract type by gender variable reaches nearly 4 
percent (b=-.036, sig. =.000). The wage differential between large and small 
organizations turned out to be insignificant, however middle size (between 200-999) 
organizations are shown to be offering better pay conditions than larger organizations 
(b=.007, sig. = .051) 
In the following analysis, the collective agreement and individual agreement models 
were regressed separately in order to tests the impact of independent variables on each 
group. 
Regression#6:    Split files by contract type variable: 
For these analyses I have split the data by contract type and conducted the same tests for 
both sets, including the union membership variable. Since only union members are 
covered by collective agreements, the union variable was automatically excluded from 
the analyses of collective agreements.  
                                                 
14 I.e. Skill shortage and rrecruitment sources (international and private market), pay settings through 
individual bargaining.  
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Evaluating the models 
Looking at the adjusted R square values, both models have good explanatory power, 
explaining 63.1 percent of the variance in ln_salaries for employees on individual 
agreements and 48.5 percent for employees covered by collective agreements. The F-
test in each of the ANOVA tests was statistically significant at p. < .001. 
IEA model coefficients (major outcomes) 
Concerning the union membership variable, being a union member and employed on 
individual agreement has very little impact, if at all, on wage rates (b= -.004, sig. 
=.055).  
Experience increases wage rates for those employees who are employed on individual 
agreements.  
The wage differential for permanent vs. fixed term employees is larger (5%), however 
at the significance of .097. On the other hand, part timers earn statistically significant 
higher salaries than full timers. 
CEA model coefficients (major outcomes) 
Examining the coefficients in the collective agreement model, I found that permanent 
employees receive higher salaries than fixed term employees (b=.018, sig. =.000). Full-
timers earn slightly more than part-timers (b= .011, sig. =.000). Employees in small 
organizations and who are employed on collectives earn more than employees on 
collectives that work in large organizations. However, organizational size does not 
make a statistical difference. 
CEA vs. IEA (major outcomes) 
High-skilled occupations (legislators and administrators, corporate managers, and some 
of the professional groups) are paid more than other occupations on both collective and 
individual agreements; however, the wage differential is larger for those employed on 
individual agreements than those on collectives. Compared to other professionals, 
teaching professionals are significantly disadvantaged under individual agreements. 
These findings are supported by the results from previous analyses.  
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Wellingtonians earn more than public servants in other regions with overseas employees 
being an exception in both models. Being male increases the ability to earn more, on 
both agreements, individual and collective. 
 
6.7. Summary 
 
In this chapter, I presented the findings of the research. The first section included 
descriptive analyses of the variables included in the dataset, followed by simple 
comparisons of the average wage between collective and individual wage across gender, 
ethnicity, age, occupation, employment term, hours worked, tenure, organization size 
and region. The raw gap (23%) indicated inferior pay conditions for employees on 
collective agreements across these factors. Collective premiums were found for younger 
workers, teaching professionals and labourers and tradespeople. Teaching professionals 
(51.2%) seem to benefit the most from being on collectives; these are, not surprisingly, 
the lowest earners out of all professionals and highly unionized workers. These findings 
are in line with the findings of a large body of previous research (Freeman and Medoff, 
1984; Card, 1991; Mishel and Walters, 2003). 
I, then, presented the results from the multivariate analyses, where I compared wages 
between collective and individual agreements, while controlling for employee and some 
employer- related characteristics.  My findings suggested that a number of factors 
influence the covered/non-covered wage gap. For instance, the occupation variable 
explains 24 percent of the variance in salary, highly-paid professionals and senior 
managerial staff played a particularly important role in shaping the nature of the gap. 
Finally, after controlling for all the available variables, the salary differences between 
collective and individual agreements were found insignificant. I found that, in most 
cases, my results comply with other studies described in chapter 4. I showed how my 
findings support or differ to the literature relating to the union/non-union wage 
differential and the factors that contribute to such gap. 
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7. Conclusions and implications 
7.1. Introduction to the Chapter 
The purpose of this study was to provide a more integrated knowledge of a collective 
bargaining role in pay setting and its impact in the New Zealand public service by 
estimating a collective/individual pay differential while controlling for a large number 
of variables that were identified as explanatory factors in previous studies. To achieve 
this I have used numerous multivariate regressions. My goals were to determine: 1) 
whether or not such a gap exists; 2) the nature of it; and 3) who are the beneficial parties 
of the potential gap. The major implications and findings gained from the empirical 
research are discussed below.  
In examining the collective/individual pay differential, and the factors that influence it, 
a number of important points emerged regarding the impact of collective bargaining on 
pay levels in the public service in New Zealand.  
 
7.2. Means comparison 
 
The raw collective vs. individual pay differential strongly suggests that covered 
employees receive inferior pay rates to those who are not covered by collective 
agreements. These differentials vary across gender, ethnicity, employer tenure, union 
membership, employer size, contract term, age, hours worked and occupational factors.  
Although a vast majority of studies conclude that union members gain higher pay rates 
than their counterparts, this finding seem to reveal a different picture. This finding, 
however, supports the hypothesis that individual agreements are frequently used to 
avoid unionization. Government departments have the resources and sophistication to 
mount concerted union avoidance and use individual employment agreements (IEAs) to 
offer wage premiums to induce workers to signs individual agreements and/or 
financially penalize those who seek to remain on collective agreements (Peets, 2008). 
The raw gap (23%) indicated inferior pay conditions for employees on collective 
agreements across these factors. Collective premiums were found for younger workers, 
teaching professionals and labourers and tradespeople. Teaching professionals (51.2%) 
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seems to benefit the most from being on collectives. These workers are, not 
surprisingly, the lowest earners out of all professionals and highly unionized 
occupational group. These findings strongly support the findings of a large body of 
previous research (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Card, 1991; Mishel and Walters, 2003). 
 
7.3. Multiple regressions 
 
Most economists point out that the contributing factors to the union/non-union pay 
differential could only be identified through multivariate analyses. The results of the 
multivariate regressions showed that when the contributing factors, including 
interaction terms are controlled for, no collective premium was found. This is a 
completely different picture to the one revealed by means comparison. Once again, it is 
not the same case for all employees. That is, the nature and the size of the 
collective/individual pay differential varies across employee and employer related 
characteristics. In general, the collective pay effect is the largest for the youngest 
workers, non – Europeans, who are the lowest paid, and the least or negative for prime-
aged workers, who are the highest paid. These findings are consistent with international 
literature.  I offer a number of explanations for this phenomenon.  
1) Although the free-riding issue has been addressed by the legislation in December 
2004, most of the agreements included in the sample of this study were negotiated prior 
to legislative changes. Also, despite the local regulation forbidding free-riding, the 
terms and conditions of collective agreements are passed on to all employees 
disregarding their union status. This is usually done in agreement with a union. What 
union members get in return is backdated pay. After all, it would be hard to do 
otherwise, given that all departments operate in the same labour marker conditions and 
are out to achieve similar goals that are set by the same governing body. 
2) Decentralized bargaining system – As was described in chapter 3, the NZ public 
service operates in a very decentralized bargaining system, where bargaining occurs at 
the departmental level. In such an environment the role of a union is relatively weaken 
and unions are less able to negotiate the same outcomes as they would have done in a 
more centralized system. Although multi-employer bargaining is promoted by the 
legislation and the PSA recognizes the benefits of it, the system remains highly 
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decentralized, indicating that no support for centralized multi-employer bargaining has 
been shown from management. The SSC has delegated its responsibilities of employer 
to Chief Executives of each department, and it seems that it intends to keep it this way. 
The shift towards enterprise bargaining thus made the emergence of sizable union wage 
differentials across different enterprises a distinct possibility. 
3) Although unions and collective bargaining have been promoted by the government 
and the appropriate legislation in the public service, union involvement in the pay-
setting process is limited. Also, employees in managerial positions are 
discouraged/pushed off collective agreements, thus increasing the pay gap between 
management and the rest of the public service. Managers are expected to perform in a 
way that departmental objectives will be achieved and to set pay levels within set 
baselines. This leads to a conclusion that unions are limited in their influence and ability 
to obtain better gains for their members and contributes to the explanation of the non-
existent collective premium. On the other hand, even where unions do have greater say 
in determining pay, they tend to standardize wage rates for union and nonunion 
members. 
4) Skill shortage is one of the main issues that government departments are looking to 
address. Occupational composition was found by a number of economists as one the 
most important explanatory variable to the union/non-union wage differential (Freeman 
and Medoff, 1984, Mulvey, 1986, Cristie, 1992, Peetz, 2001). These results support this 
hypothesis. Some of the differential can be explained by the fact that, high pay-levels 
are highly correlated with the recruitment source of these employees. NZ public service 
has a unique structure in the way that it relies quite heavily on professionals. This group 
is internationally dominated (with the exception of teaching professionals) due to high 
levels of skill shortage in NZ, meaning that a percentage of these employees come with 
international experience, and therefore are in high demand and are able to negotiate 
higher salaries through individual bargaining. Employers are “forced” to offer higher 
than average salaries to be able to attract those talented candidates to the public service. 
In contrast, union members and employees covered by collectives are usually 
employees with a lower length of service (within a Department), working their way up 
within a department or across departments and are New Zealanders. These employees 
earn lower salaries than their “imported” counterparts.  
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5) Level of education would be another explanation for those differences. Nevertheless, 
due to data constraints, the education or skill level variables were not available for this 
study.  
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8. Areas for Further Research 
8.1. Introduction to the Chapter 
 
This chapter proposes areas for further research provided by the limitations of the 
dataset and the methodology used in this study (a detailed summary of those is provided 
in chapter 5).  The results highlight several important insights and constructs that are 
may need further research. First of all, when compared to broader international studies, 
that use a wide range of methods to estimate the union/non-union wage differential, as 
well as different type of datasets, more work needs to be done to test the generalisability 
of the findings in other settings, datasets and statistical approaches if they are actually 
fair representatives of the collective/individual pay estimates in the NZ public service 
unique context. 
Second, although my dataset contains a large number of employee-employer related 
characteristics, I can not claim to have a comprehensive set of the collective/individual 
pay gap contributing factors. I compared salaries between collective and individual 
agreements across ethnicity, age, gender, employment term, occupation, tenure, hours 
worked, organization size and region. Yet, due to data constraints, I ignored other 
explanatory factors that were identified in previous studies. For instance, education, 
training, and marital status were found by other researchers (e.g., Booth and Bryan, 
2004) as being union membership related and therefore important controls. In addition, 
Wooden (2001) argued that datasets should enable differences across bargaining units, 
especially in decentralized bargaining environment to produce true estimates. This can 
be achieved by including coverage by enterprise agreements and identifying workplaces 
with agreements compared to those without them, though neither of these pieces of 
information was provided to me. A better test of the impact of unions on wages, 
especially in an environment where enterprise-level bargaining is pervasive, requires 
data on wages and characteristics of individual workers that can then be linked to 
characteristics of the firm and workplaces at which they are employed. Most important 
of all, data are required on the features of union and bargaining activity at those 
workplaces. Measures of degree of union coverage or activity within the bargaining 
group to which the individual belongs (Booth, 1995) should also be included to provide 
better estimates of the collective bargaining impact on wages. 
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Furthermore, measures of the context specifics are also important, such as labor 
demand, unemployment rates and union density, offer interesting avenues for future 
research. 
Finally, no panel data was available; therefore time series analyses could not be 
conducted, leaving an area for further research. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One: Table One - Variable Definitions 
 
Gender Female or male (3 employees refused – were not included) 
    1 if employee is male; 0 if otherwise 
Ethnicity Classification is based on level 3 and 4 of NZSCE produced by Statistics New Zealand 
   New Zealand European (Pakeha) = 1 if employee is New Zealand European; 0 if otherwise 
   Maori = 1 if employee is Maori; 0 if otherwise 
   Asian = 1 if employee is Asian; 0 if otherwise 
   Non-NZ European = 1 if employee is non-NZ European; 0 if otherwise 
   Pacific Islander = 1 if employee is Pacific Islander; 0 if otherwise 
   Other Ethnic Groups = 1 if employee is Other Ethnic Groups; 0 if otherwise 
    Unknown = 1 if employee is unknown; 0 if otherwise 
  Note: "New Zealander" is not regarded as an ethnicity and is coded to "unknown" 
Two Digit 
NZSCO   
   11 (Legislative and Admin) = 1 if employee is legislative or admin; 0 if otherwise 
   12 (Corporate Manager) = 1 if employee is corporate manager; 0 if otherwise 
   
21 (Physical, Mathematical and Engineering Science Profession) = 1 if 
employee is physical, mathematical and engineering science profession; 
0 if otherwise 
   22 (Live Science and Health Professions) = 1 if employee is live science and health profession; 0 if otherwise 
   23 (Teaching Profession) = 1 if employee is teaching profession; 0 if otherwise 
   24 (Other Profession) = 1 if employee is other profession; 0 if otherwise 
   3 (Associate Profession) = 1 if employee is associate profession; 0 if otherwise 
   4 (Clerk) = 1 if employee is clerk; 0 if otherwise 
   5 (Labourers and Trade Workers) = 1 if employee is labourer and trade workers; 0 if otherwise 
    6 (Unknown) = 1 if employee is unknown; 0 if otherwise 
Contract 
Term Fixed (temporary) or open term (permanent) 
    1 if employee is permanent; 0 if otherwise 
Tenure Length of service (years) in the same organization 
   Less than 1 year = 1 if employee is less than 1 year; 0 if otherwise 
   1 year = 1 if employee is 1 year; 0 if otherwise 
   2 years = 1 if employee is 2 years; 0 if otherwise 
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   3 years = 1 if employee is 3 years; 0 if otherwise 
   4 years = 1 if employee is 4 years; 0 if otherwise 
   5 to 9 years = 1 if employee is 5 to 9 years; 0 if otherwise 
    Over 10 years = 1 if employee is over 10 years; 0 if otherwise 
Salary Annual full time base salary as at the survey data 
Region Part of New Zealand in which located 
   Auckland = 1 if employee is Auckland; 0 if otherwise 
   Wellington = 1 if employee is Wellington; 0 if otherwise 
   Rest of North Island = 1 if employee is rest of North Island; 0 if otherwise 
   South Island = 1 if employee is South Island; 0 if otherwise 
    Missing/Overseas = 1 if employee is missing/overseas; 0 if otherwise 
Department 
size 
Data presented in 3 groups; less than 200 employees, between 200 and 999 employees, 
and 1000 or more employees 
   Less than 200 = 1 if employee is less than 200; 0 if otherwise 
   200 to 999 = 1 if employee is 200 to 999; 0 if otherwise 
    1000 or more = 1 if employee is 1000 or more; 0 if otherwise 
Union 
Membership Membership of a registered union (eg. PSA, NUPE, Finsec, etc.) 
  Includes all union memberships the organization is aware of, not just those for which subs are deducted through the payroll.  
    1 if employee is a union member; 0 if otherwise 
Age Group Data is available in groups (eg. Group 1: 20-25 etc).  A midpoint was calculated for each band. 
   Under 20 = 1 if employee is under 20; 0 if otherwise 
   20-24 = 1 if employee is 20-24; 0 if otherwise 
   25-29 = 1 if employee is 25-29; 0 if otherwise 
   30-34 = 1 if employee is 30-34; 0 if otherwise 
   35-39 = 1 if employee is 35-39; 0 if otherwise 
   40-44 = 1 if employee is 40-44; 0 if otherwise 
   45-49 = 1 if employee is 45-49; 0 if otherwise 
   50-54 = 1 if employee is 50-54; 0 if otherwise 
   55-59 = 1 if employee is 55-59; 0 if otherwise 
   60-64 = 1 if employee is 60-64; 0 if otherwise 
    over 65 = 1 if employee is over 65; 0 if otherwise 
Hours 
Worked Standard hours this employee works per week; full time and part time 
    1 if employee is full time; 0 if otherwise 
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Appendix Two: Table One - Numbers of Observations 
 
  
All 
N and (%) 
Collective  
N and (%) 
Individual  
N and (%) 
All employees 40,290 21,878 (54.3) 18, 412 (45.7) 
Gender: 40,287 (99.9) 21,878 (54.3) 18,409 (45.7) 
Women 23,833 (59.2) 13,107 (55) 10,726  (45) 
Men 16,454 8,771 (53) 7,683  (47) 
Open -term 36,611 (90.8) 21,280 (58.1) 15,331 (41.9) 
Fixed- term 3,679 598 (16.3) 3,081 (83.7) 
Union member 23, 281 19,127 (82.2) 4,154  (17.8) 
PSA 17,664 (75.9) 1,948 (84.6) 2,716  (15.4) 
Full-time 36,699 (91.1) 20,069 (54.7) 16,630 (45.3) 
Part-time 3,591 1,809 (50.4) 1782  (49.6) 
Employer size (ees): 40,290 21,878 (54.3) 18,412  (45.7) 
>200 974 (2.4) 150 (15.4) 824 (84.6) 
200-999 5,136 (12.7) 2,148  (41.8) 2,988 (58.2) 
1000+ 34,180 (84.9) 19,580 (56.5) 14,600 (43.5) 
Occupational 
category: 40,290 21,878 (54.3) 18,412 (45.7) 
Legislative and admin 75 (0.2) 26 (34.7) 49 (65.3) 
Corporate manager 3,895 (9.7) 763 (19.6) 3,132 (80.4) 
Physical, 
Mathematical & 
Engineering Science 
Professionals 
1,057 (2.6) 371 (35.1) 686 (64.9) 
Life Science & Health 
Professionals 1,008 (2.5) 636 (63.1) 372 (36.9) 
Teaching 
Professionals 2,083 (5.2) 1,009 (48.4) 1,074 (51.6) 
Other Professionals 7,631 (18.9) 2,960 (38.8) 4,671 (61.2) 
Associate 
Professionals 13,960 (36.6) 9,206 (65.9) 4,754 (34.1) 
Clerks 7,047 (17.5) 4,497 (63.8) 2,550 (36.2) 
Labourers and Trade 
Workers 3,078 (7.6) 2,272 (73.8) 806 (26.2) 
Response Unknown 456 (1.1) 138 (30.3) 318 (69.7) 
Age: 39,511 (98.1) 21,655 (54.8) 17,856 (43.2) 
>20 310  (0.8) 134 (43.2) 176 (56.8) 
20-24 2,265 (5.7) 1,089 (48.1) 1,176 (51.9) 
25-29 4,069 (10.3) 1,927 (47.4) 2,142 (52.6) 
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30-34 4932 (12.5) 2,433 (49.3) 2,499 (50.7) 
35-39 5519    (14) 2,897 (52.5) 2,622 (47.5) 
40-44 6,194 (15.7) 3,443 (55.6) 2,751 (44.4) 
45-49 5,702 (14.4) 3,281 (58.0) 2,421 (42.0) 
50-54 4,645 (11.8) 2,774 (59.7) 1,871 (40.3) 
55-59 3,554  (9) 2,183 (61.4) 1,371 (38.6) 
60-64 1,823   (4.6) 1,171 (64.2) 652 (35.8) 
65+ 498   (1.3) 323 (64.9) 175 (35.1) 
Tenure (years): 40,289 (99.9) 21,878 (54.3) 18,411 (45.7) 
>1 8,347 (20.7) 2,736 (32.8) 5,611 (67.2) 
1 5,239 (13) 2,374 (45.3) 2,865 (54.7) 
2 3,491 (8.7) 1,734 (49.7) 1,757 (50.3) 
3 2,699 (6.7) 1,421 (52.6) 1,278 (47.4) 
4 2,752 (6.8) 1,618 (58.8) 1,134 (41.2) 
5-9 6,682 (16.6) 3,965 (59.3) 2,717 (40.7) 
10+ 11,079 (27.5) 8,030 (72.5) 3,049 (27.5) 
Ethnicity: 40,290 21,655 (55.7) 17,856 (44.3) 
Pacific Islanders 2,183  (5.4) 1,391 (64.7) 792 (36.3) 
Asians 1,803  (4.5) 985 (54.6) 818 (45.4) 
NZ European 21,971 (54.5) 11,698 (53.2) 10,273 (46.8) 
Maori 5,914 (15.7) 3,626 (61.3) 2,288 (38.7) 
Non-NZ Europeans 3,433  (8.5) 1,617 (47.1) 1,816 (52.9) 
Other Ethnic Group 438  (1.1) 225 (51.4) 213 (48.6) 
Unknown 4,548 (11.3) 2,336 (51.4) 2,212 (48.6) 
Region: 40,290 21,878 (54.3) 18,412 (45.7) 
Auckland 8,176 (20.3) 5,344(65.4) 2,832 (34.6) 
Wellington 16,159 (40.1) 6,074 (37.6) 10,085 (62.4) 
Rest of North Island 9,060 (22.5) 5,970 (65.9) 3,090 (34.1) 
South Island 6,639 (16.5) 4,331 (65.2) 2,308 (34.8) 
Missing/Overseas 256  (0.6) 159 (62.1) 97 (37.9) 
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Appendix Two: Table Two - Mean values of variables and pay 
differentials 
 
 All ($) Collecolllctive Individual 
Pay 
Differential 
(%) 
   $ N Std. Error $ N 
Std. 
Error  
All employees $50,689 $44,561 21878 $85.37 $57,970 18412 $223.95 -23.1 
Women $47,035 $43,163 10726 $102 $51,720 10726 $252 -16.5 
Men $55,982 $46,605 7683 $145 $66,687 7683 $384 -30.1 
Open -term $51,426 $44,741 21280 $86 $60,705 15331 $245 -26.3 
Fixed- term $43,354 $38,154 598 $587 $44,363 3081 $487 -14.0 
Full-time $51,156 $44,573 20069 $89 $59,100 16630 $238 -24.6 
Part-time $45,913 $44,424 1809 $287 $47,424 1782 $606 -6.3 
Age:         
>20 $28,747 $30,008 134 $253 $27,787 176 $303 8.0 
20-24 $35,208 $34,836 1089 $156 $35,552 1176 $198 -2.0 
25-29 $41,743 $38,941 1927 $179 $44,264 2142 $279 -12.0 
30-34 $47,706 $43,062 2433 $232 $52,228 2499 $396 -17.5 
35-39 $51,392 $44,536 2897 $226 $58,968 2622 $554 -24.5 
40-44 $53,505 $45,439 3443 $216 $63,600 2751 $610 -28.6 
45-49 $55,141 $46,893 3281 $231 $66,319 2421 $728 -29.3 
50-54 $56,424 $47,468 2774 $245 $69,702 1871 $833 -31.9 
55-59 $56,638 $47,851 2183 $290 $70,628 1371 $1,016 -32.2 
60-64 $52,519 $46,385 1171 $424 $63,537 652 $1,263 -27.0 
65+ $47,751 $44,256 323 $685 $54,201 175 $1,678 -18.3 
Tenure (years):         
>1 $44,662 $37,305 2736 $207 $48,250 5611 $356 -22.7 
1 $46,065 $39,847 2374 $229 $51,217 2865 $484 -22.2 
2 $48,463 $41,392 1734 $264 $55,441 1757 $630 -25.3 
3 $51,507 $43,436 1421 $298 $60,481 1278 $819 -28.2 
4 $51,083 $43,630 1618 $272 $61,715 1134 $836 -29.3 
5 to 9 $53,501 $45,336 3965 $177 $65,418 2717 $606 -30.7 
10+ $56,124 $49,115 8030 $148 $74,582 3049 $611 -34.1 
Ethnicity:         
Pacific Islanders $40,833 $39,400 1391 $209 $43,349 792 $611 -9.1 
Asians $46,379 $41,668 985 $378 $52,052 818 $874 -19.9 
NZ European $52,761 $45,723 11698 $120 $60,774 10273 $319 -24.8 
Maori $45,301 $41,805 3626 $165 $50,841 2288 $499 -17.8 
Non-NZ Europeans $54,735 $46,771 1617 $354 $61,827 1816 $713 -24.4 
Other Ethnic Group $50,959 $46,283 225 $1,105 $55,899 213 $1,766 -17.2 
Unknown $51,046 $45,615 2336 $288 $56,782 2212 $637 -19.7 
 83
Employer size (ees):         
>200 $70,271 $52,889 150 $1,849 $73,436 824 $1,310 -28.0 
200-999 $62,807 $54,264 2148 $359 $68,748 2988 $650 -21.1 
1000+ $48,310 $43,433 19580 $82 $54,851 14600 $231 -20.8 
Occupational 
category:         
Legislative and admin $121,266 $91,271 26 $2,081 $137,182 49 $4,613 -33.5 
Corporate manager $84,676 $58,354 763 $593 $91,089 3132 $674 -35.9 
Physical, Mathematical 
& Engineering Science 
Professionals 
$63,231 $57,699 371 $687 $66,222 686 $789 -12.9 
Life Science & Health 
Professionals $56,199 $51,531 636 $513 $64,181 372 $1,313 -19.7 
Teaching Professionals $41,343 $50,092 1009 $435 $33,123 1074 $471 51.2 
Other Professionals $63,585 $57,343 2960 $290 $67,541 4671 $380 -15.1 
Associate 
Professionals $41,889 $41,333 9206 $93 $42,965 4754 $203 -3.8 
Clerks $38,744 $38,170 4497 $106 $39,756 2550 $223 -4.0 
Labourers and Trade 
Workers $41,599 $41,730 2272 $131 $41,232 806 $400 1.2 
Response Unknown $49,754 $47,670 138 $131 $50,659 318 $1,252 -5.9 
Region:         
Auckland $43,752 $42,076 5344 $141 $46,913 2832 $373 -10.3 
Wellington $60,259 $49,245 6074 $205 $66,893 10086 $373 -26.4 
Rest of North Island $43,303 $44,293 5970 $127 $45,256 3090 $345 -2.1 
South Island $44,753 $43,304 4331 $155 $47,472 2308 $417 -8.8 
Missing/Overseas $83,467 $68,535 159 $1,514 $107,942 97 $4,259 -36.5 
 
 
 
  
Appendix Two: Table Three - Pearson Correlations 
 
 
 
** =Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
  
  Ethnicity 2-digit NZSCO 
Contract 
Term Tenure 
FTE 
Salary 
5 
Regions 
Organization 
Size Age 
Full time 
or Part 
time 
Contract 
type 
Union 
membership 
FTE Salary Correlation coefficient -0.016** -.424** .099** .183** 1 1.067** -.241** .217** -0.64** -.284** -.231** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
  N 40290 40290 40290 40289 40290 40290 40290 39511 40290 40290 37539 
Contract type Correlation coefficient -.024** .202** .242** .277** -.284** .-082** .159** .104** -.025** 1 .798** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
0.000 
  N 40290 40290 40290 40289 40290 40290 40290 39511 40290 40290 37539 
Union 
membership 
status 
Correlation 
coefficient -.032** .149** .192** .273** -.231** .086** .128** .126** -.049** .798** 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
  N 37539 37539 37539 37538 37539 37539 37539 36841 37539 37539 37539 
85 
 
Appendix Three - Regression One: 
 
Model Summary     
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
0.762 0.580 0.580 0.104   
      
ANOVA      
       
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 602.792 42 14.352 1324.599 0.000 
Residual 436.081 40247 0.011   
Total 1038.873 40289       
      
 Unstandardized Coefficients      
               B                                         Std. Error Sig.   
Intercept 4.662 0.007 0.000   
Gender 0.027 0.001 0.000   
Contract Term 0.054 0.002 0.000   
Hours Worked 0.015 0.002 0.000   
Contract Type -0.028 0.001 0.000   
Union 
membership -0.016 0.001 0.000   
Age:      
>20 -0.106 0.007 0.000   
20-24 -0.062 0.004 0.000   
25-29 -0.03 0.003 0.000   
30-34 0.005 0.003 0.106   
35-39 0.021 0.003 0.000   
40-44 0.03 0.003 0.000   
45-49 0.036 0.003 0.000   
50-54 0.041 0.003 0.000   
55-59 0.037 0.003 0.000   
60-64 0.021 0.004 0.000   
65+ * * *   
Tenure (years):      
>1 -0.063 0.002 0.000   
1 -0.051 0.002 0.000   
2 -0.041 0.002 0.000   
3 -0.026 0.002 0.000   
4 -0.024 0.002 0.000   
5 to 9 -0.014 0.002 0.000   
10+ * * *   
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Ethnicity:      
Pacific Islanders * * *   
Asians 0.009 0.003 0.004   
NZ European 0.033 0.002 0.000   
Maori 0.02 0.003 0.000   
Non-NZ 
Europeans 0.042 0.003 0.000   
Other Ethnic 0.026 0.005 0.000   
Unknown 0.022 0.003 0.000   
Employer size 
( )
     
>200 0.028 0.003 0.000   
200-999 0.028 0.002 0.000   
1000+ * * *   
Occupational 
category:      
Legislative and 
admin 0.264 0.015 0.000   
Corporate 
manager 0.149 0.005 0.000   
Physical, 
Mathematical & 
Engineering 
Science 
Professionals 
0.044 0.006 0.000   
Life Science & 
Health 
Professionals 
0.031 0.006 0.000   
Teaching 
Professionals -0.071 0.005 0.000   
Other 
Professionals 0.054 0.005 0.000   
Associate 
Professionals 
-0.062 0.005 0.000   
Clerks -0.102 0.005 0.000   
Labourers and 
Trade Workers -0.084 0.005 0.000   
Response * * *   
Region:      
Auckland -0.053 0.002 0.000   
Rest of North 
Island -0.064 0.002 0.000   
South Island -0.067 0.002 0.000   
Missing/Overseas -0.005 0.008 0.508   
Wellington * * *   
 
* = omitted category 
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Appendix Three - Regression Two: 
 
Model Summary     
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate   
0.761 0.579 0.578 0.104   
      
ANOVA     
        
Model Sum of df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 601.399 41 14.668 1349.494 0.000 
Residual 437.474 40248 0.011   
Total 1038.873 40289       
      
 Unstandardized    
  B Std. Error Sig.   
Intercept 4.660 0.007 0.000   
Gender 0.027 0.001 0.000   
Contract Term 0.054 0.002 0.000   
Hours Worked 0.014 0.002 0.000   
Contract Type -0.037 0.001 0.000   
Union membership status Not included in the regression   
Age:      
>20 -0.107 0.007 0.000   
20-24 -0.063 0.004 0.000   
25-29 -0.030 0.003 0.000   
30-34 0.005 0.003 0.123   
35-39 0.020 0.003 0.000   
40-44 0.030 0.003 0.000   
45-49 0.036 0.003 0.000   
50-54 0.040 0.003 0.000   
55-59 0.037 0.003 0.000   
60-64 0.021 0.004 0.000   
65+ * * *   
Tenure (years):      
>1 -0.061 0.002 0.000   
1 -0.049 0.002 0.000   
2 -0.040 0.002 0.000   
3 -0.025 0.002 0.000   
4 -0.023 0.002 0.000   
5 to 9 -0.013 0.002 0.000   
10+ * * *   
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Ethnicity:      
Asians 0.009 0.003 0.005   
NZ European/Pakeha 0.033 0.002 0.000   
Maori 0.020 0.003 0.000   
Non-NZ European 0.042 0.003 0.000   
Other Ethnic Groups 0.026 0.005 0.000   
Unknown 0.023 0.003 0.000   
Pacific Islanders * * *   
Employer size (ees):      
>200 0.040 0.003 0.000   
200-999 0.027 0.002 0.000   
1000+ * * *   
Occupational category:      
Legislative and admin 0.259 0.015 0.000   
Corporate manager 0.148 0.005 0.000   
Physical, Mathematical & 
Engineering Science Professionals 0.044 0.006 0.000   
Life Science & Health 
Professionals 0.030 0.006 0.000   
Teaching Professionals -0.071 0.005 0.000   
Other Professionals 0.054 0.005 0.000   
Associate Professionals -0.063 0.005 0.000   
Clerks -0.103 0.005 0.000   
Labourers and Trade Workers -0.084 0.005 0.000   
Response Unknown * * *   
Region:      
Auckland -0.053 0.002 0.000   
Rest of North Island -0.064 0.002 0.000   
South Island -0.067 0.002 0.000   
Missing/Overseas -0.006 0.008 0.455   
Wellington * * *   
 
* = omitted category 
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Appendix Three - Regression Three: 
 
Model Summary     
    
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate   
0.759                           0.577 0.576 0.105   
      
ANOVA      
        
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression                  599.088 41 14.612 1337.246 0.000 
Residual 439.785 40248 0.011   
Total 1038.873 40289       
 Unstandardize     
  B Std. Error Sig.   
Intercept 4.658 0.007 0.000   
Gender         0.027                         0.001 0.000   
Contract Term 0.048 0.002 0.000   
Hours Worked 0.017 0.002 0.000   
Union -0.031 0.001 0.000   
Age:      
>20 -0.107 0.007 0.000   
20-24 -0.063 0.004 0.000   
25-29 -0.031 0.003 0.000   
30-34 0.005 0.003 0.150   
35-39 0.020 0.003 0.000   
40-44 0.029 0.003 0.000   
45-49 0.035 0.003 0.000   
50-54 0.040 0.003 0.000   
55-59 0.037 0.003 0.000   
60-64 0.020 0.004 0.000   
65+ * * *   
Tenure (years):      
>1 -0.058 0.002 0.000   
1 -0.048 0.002 0.000   
2 -0.038 0.002 0.000   
3 -0.023 0.002 0.000   
4 -0.022 0.002 0.000   
5 to 9 -0.012 0.002 0.000   
10+ * * *   
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Ethnicity:      
Asians 0.010 0.003 0.004   
NZ 
European/Pakeha
0.034 0.002 0.000   
Maori 0.020 0.003 0.000   
Non-NZ 
E
0.044 0.003 0.000   
Other Ethnic 
Groups
0.027 0.005 0.000   
Unknown 0.023 0.003 0.000   
Pacific Islanders * * *   
Employer size      
>200 0.044 0.003 0.000   
200-999 0.029 0.002 0.000   
1000+ * * *   
Occupational 
category:      
Legislative and 
admin 0.276 0.015 0.000   
Corporate 0.156 0.005 0.000   
Physical, 
Mathematical & 
Engineering 
Science 
f i l
0.046 0.006 0.000   
Life Science & 
Health 
P f i l
0.032 0.006 0.000   
Teaching 
Professionals -0.071 0.005 0.000   
Other 
Professionals 0.056 0.005 0.000   
Associate 
Professionals -0.063 0.005 0.000   
Clerks -0.103 0.005 0.000   
Labourers and 
Trade Workers -0.087 0.005 0.000   
Response 
Unknown * * *   
Region:      
Auckland -0.055 0.002 0.000   
Rest of North 
I l d
-0.067 0.002 0.000   
South Island -0.069 0.002 0.000   
Missing/Overseas -0.010 0.008 0.195   
Wellington * * *   
 
* = omitted category 
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Appendix Three - Regression Four: 
 
Model Summary    
          
R                                     R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate   
0.786 0.617 0.617 0.099   
      
ANOVA      
        
Model                   Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 641.422 80 8.018 811.136 0.000 
Residual 397.451 40209 0.010   
Total 1038.873 40289       
      
  Unstandardized Coefficients     
 
  B Std. Error Sig.   
Intercept        4.655                      0.008 0.000   
Gender 0.034 0.002 0.000   
Contract Term 0.035 0.002 0.000   
Hours Worked 0.026 0.003 0.000   
Contract type -0.021 0.013 0.113   
Age:      
>20 -0.133 0.008 0.000   
20-24 -0.083 0.005 0.000   
25-29 -0.040 0.004 0.000   
30-34 0.003 0.004 0.441   
35-39 0.030 0.004 0.000   
40-44 0.045 0.004 0.000   
45-49 0.048 0.004 0.000   
50-54 0.055 0.004 0.000   
55-59 0.053 0.005 0.000   
60-64 0.035 0.005 0.000   
65+ * * *   
Tenure (years):      
>1 -0.053 0.003 0.000   
1 -0.045 0.003 0.000   
2 -0.040 0.003 0.000   
3 -0.024 0.003 0.000   
4 -0.021 0.004 0.000   
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5 to 9 -0.012 0.003 0.000   
10+ * * *   
Ethnicity:      
Asians 0.012 0.004 0.007   
NZ 
European/Pakeha 0.041 0.003 0.000   
Maori 0.022 0.004 0.000   
Non-NZ 0.044 0.003 0.000   
Other Ethnic 
Groups 0.030 0.007 0.000   
Unknown 0.027 0.004 0.000   
Pacific Islanders * * *   
Employer size      
>200 0.033 0.004 0.000   
200-999 0.024 0.002 0.000   
1000+ * * *   
Occupational 
category:      
Legislative and 
admin 0.296 0.019 0.000   
Corporate 
manager 0.170 0.006 0.000   
Physical, 
Mathematical & 
Engineering 
Science 
Professionals 
0.049 0.007 0.000   
Life Science & 
Health 
Professionals 
0.077 0.008 0.000   
Teaching 
Professionals -0.147 0.007 0.000   
Other 
Professionals 0.065 0.006 0.000   
Associate 
Professionals -0.060 0.006 0.000   
Clerks -0.100 0.006 0.000   
Labourers and 
Trade Workers -0.104 0.007 0.000   
Response 
Unknown 
* * *   
Region:      
Auckland -0.072 0.002 0.000   
Rest of North 
Island 
-0.089 0.002 0.000   
South Island -0.095 0.002 0.000   
Missing/Overseas -0.012 0.013 0.346   
Wellington * * *   
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Intermediate B Std. Error Sig.   
Contract Type      
Hours -0.023 0.004 0.000   
Term 0.008 0.005 0.090   
Gender -0.02 0.002 0.000   
Employer Size 
<200 -0.022 0.009 0.013   
Employer Size 
200 - 999 0.005 0.003 0.154   
Employer Size: > 
200 * * *   
Region: 
Auckland 
0.043 0.003 0.000   
Region: Rest of 
North Island 
0.053 0.003 0.000   
Region: South 
Island 
0.057 0.003 0.000   
Region: Missing 
and Overseas  0.027 0.016 0.091   
Region: 
Wellington * * *   
Tenure: <1 year -0.029 0.004 0.000   
Tenure: 1 year -0.018 0.004 0.000   
Tenure: 2 years -0.012 0.004 0.006   
Tenure: 3 years -0.013 0.005 0.004   
Tenure: 4 years -0.014 0.005 0.002   
Tenure: 5-9 years -0.011 0.003 0.001   
Tenure: 10+ 
years * * *   
Occupational 
category: 
Legislative and 
Admin 
-0.115 0.03 0.000   
Occupational 
category: 
Corporate 
manager 
-0.116 0.011 0.000   
Occupational 
category: 
Physical, 
Mathematical & 
Engineering 
Science 
Professionals 
-0.008 0.012 0.509   
Occupational 
category: Life 
Science & Health 
Professionals 
-0.061 0.012 0.000   
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Occupational 
category: 
Teaching 
Professionals 
0.164 0.011 0.000   
Occupational 
category: Other 
Professionals 
-0.015 0.011 0.157   
Occupational 
category: 
Associate 
Professionals 
0.004 0.01 0.694   
Occupational 
category: Clerks 0.004 0.011 0.730   
Occupational 
category: 
Labourers and 
Trade Workers 
0.042 0.011 0.000   
Occupational 
category: 
Response 
Unknown 
* * *   
Ethnicity: Asians 0 0.006 0.953   
Ethnicity: NZ 
European/Pakeha -0.013 0.003 0.000   
Ethnicity: Maori -0.002 0.004 0.679   
Ethnicity: Non-
NZ European -0.004 0.01 0.721   
Ethnicity: 
Unknown -0.001 0.004 0.762   
Ethnicity: Pacific 
Islanders * * *   
Age: Under 20 0.071 0.013 0.000   
Age: 20 - 24 0.053 0.007 0.000   
Age: 25 - 29 0.031 0.007 0.000   
Age: 30 - 34 0.012 0.006 0.071   
Age: 35 - 39 -0.012 0.006 0.057   
Age: 40 - 44 -0.024 0.006 0.000   
Age: 45 - 49 -0.022 0.037 0.001   
Age: 50 - 54 -0.028 0.006 0.000   
Age: 55 - 59 -0.03 0.007 0.000   
Age: 60 - 64 -0.026 0.008 0.001   
Age: Over 64 * * *   
 
* = omitted category 
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Appendix Three - Regression Five: 
 
Model Summary     
R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of   
0.742 0.550 0.549 0.108   
      
ANOVA     
        
Model Sum of df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 571.309 68 8.402 722.728 0.000 
Residual 467.563 40221 0.012   
Total 1038.873 40289       
      
 Unstandardized    
  B Std. Error Sig.   
Intercept 0.468 0.006 0.000   
Gender 0.051 0.002 0.000   
Contract Term 0.085 0.002 0.000   
Hours Worked 0.049 0.003 0.000   
Contract Type -0.009 0.009 0.322   
Union membership status Not included in the regression   
Age:      
>20 -0.123 0.009 0.000   
20-24 -0.082 0.005 0.000   
25-29 -0.043 0.005 0.000   
30-34 0.002 0.005 0.064   
35-39 0.03 0.005 0.000   
40-44 0.048 0.005 0.000   
45-49 0.055 0.005 0.000   
50-54 0.066 0.005 0.000   
55-59 0.062 0.005 0.000   
60-64 0.038 0.006 0.000   
65+ * * *   
Tenure (years):      
>1 -0.075 0.003 0.000   
1 -0.069 0.003 0.000   
2 -0.065 0.003 0.000   
3 -0.048 0.004 0.000   
4 -0.043 0.004 0.000   
5 to 9 -0.029 0.003 0.000   
10+ * * *   
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Ethnicity:      
Maori 0.01 0.005 0.039   
Asian 0.043 0.003 0.000   
Non-NZ European 0.031 0.004 0.000   
Other Ethnic Groups 0.044 0.003 0.000   
Pacific Islanders 0.029 0.008 0.000   
Unknown 0.029 0.004 0.000   
Pakeha * * *   
Employer size (ees):      
>200 0.031 0.004 0.000   
200-999 0.024 0.002 0.000   
1000+ * * *   
Occupational category:      
Associate Professionals -0.124 0.002 0.000   
Clerks -0.164 0.002 0.000   
Labourers and Trade Workers -0.182 0.004 0.000   
Region:      
Auckland  -0.089 0.002 0.000   
Rest of North Island -0.113 0.002 0.000   
South Island -0.112 0.003 0.000   
Missing/Overseas 0.072 0.011 0.000   
Wellington  * * *   
Intermediate Terms:      
Contract Type by:      
Hours -0.045 0.004 0.000   
Term -0.036 0.002 0.000   
Gender -0.036 0.005 0.000   
Employer Size <200 -0.014 0.01 0.164   
Employer Size 200 - 999 0.007 0.004 0.051   
Employer Size: > 200 * * *   
Location: Auckland 0.058 0.003 0.000   
Location: Rest of North Island 0.075 0.003 0.000   
Location: South Island 0.071 0.003 0.000   
Location: Missing and Overseas  -0.03 0.014 0.035   
Location: Wellington * * *   
Tenure: <1 year -0.009 0.004 0.029   
Tenure: 1 year 0.004 0.004 0.311   
Tenure: 2 years 0.011 0.005 0.013   
Tenure: 3 years 0.009 0.005 0.080   
Tenure: 4 years 0.006 0.005 0.185   
Tenure: 5-9 years 0.004 0.004 0.281   
Tenure: 10+ years * * *   
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Occupational category: Legislative 
and Admin 0.029 0.003 0.000   
Occupational category: Corporate 
manager 0.028 0.003 0.000   
Occupational category: Physical, 
Mathematical & Engineering 
Science Professionals 
0.082 0.005 0.000   
Ethnicity: Maori 0.004 0.006 0.507   
Ethnicity: Asians -0.015 0.003 0.000   
Ethnicity: Non-NZ Europeans -0.012 0.004 0.003   
Ethnicity: Pacific Islander -0.001 0.011 0.894   
Ethnicity: Unknown -0.003 0.004 0.528   
Ethnicity: NZ European/Pakeha * * *   
Age: Under 20 0.064 0.014 0.000   
Age: 20 - 24 0.054 0.008 0.000   
Age: 25 - 29 0.036 0.007 0.000   
Age: 30 - 34 0.015 0.007 0.028   
Age: 35 - 39 -0.01 0.007 0.148   
Age: 40 - 44 -0.026 0.007 0.000   
Age: 45 - 49 -0.028 0.007 0.000   
Age: 50 - 54 -0.038 0.007 0.000   
Age: 55 - 59 -0.039 0.007 0.000   
Age: 60 - 64 -0.028 0.008 0.001   
Age: Over 64 * * *   
 
* = omitted category 
 
NB: The following Occupational categories have been left out - Administrators and 
Legislators, Corporate Managers and All Professionals 
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Appendix Three - Regression Six: 
 
Individual Employment Agreement (IEA) Model   
          
R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of   
0.795 0.632 0.631 0.119   
      
ANOVA     
        
Model Sum of df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 447.543 40 11.189 788.019 0.000 
Residual 260.838 18371 0.014   
Total 708.382 18411       
      
 Unstandardized    
  B Std. Error Sig.   
Intercept 4.641 0.01 0.000   
Gender 0.034 0.002 0.000   
Contract Term 0.035 0.003 0.000   
Hours Worked 0.026 0.003 0.000   
Union membership status -0.003 0.002 0.120   
Age:      
>20 -0.132 0.01 0.000   
20-24 -0.082 0.006 0.000   
25-29 -0.04 0.005 0.000   
30-34 0.004 0.005 0.458   
35-39 0.03 0.005 0.000   
40-44 0.045 0.005 0.000   
45-49 0.048 0.005 0.000   
50-54 0.055 0.005 0.000   
55-59 0.052 0.006 0.000   
60-64 0.034 0.007 0.000   
65+ * * *   
Tenure (years):      
>1 -0.054 0.003 0.000   
1 -0.046 0.003 0.000   
2 -0.041 0.004 0.000   
3 -0.025 0.004 0.000   
4 -0.021 0.004 0.000   
5 to 9 -0.013 0.003 0.000   
10+ * * *   
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Ethnicity:      
Maori 0.027 0.006 0.000   
Asian 0.056 0.005 0.000   
Non-NZ European 0.037 0.005 0.000   
Other Ethnic Groups 0.066 0.005 0.000   
Pacific Islanders 0.045 0.009 0.000   
Unknown 0.042 0.005 0.000   
Pakeha * * *   
Employer size (ees):      
>200 0.034 0.004 0.000   
200-999 0.024 0.003 0.000   
1000+ * * *   
Occupational category:      
Legislative and admin 0.296 0.023 0.000   
Corporate manager 0.171 0.007 0.000   
Physical, Mathematical & 
Engineering Science 
Professionals 
0.049 0.008 0.000   
Life Science & Health 
Professionals 0.076 0.009 0.000   
Teaching Professionals -0.146 0.008 0.000   
Other Professionals 0.065 0.007 0.000   
Associate Professionals -0.06 0.007 0.000   
Clerks -0.1 0.007 0.000   
Labourers and Trade Workers -0.102 0.008 0.000   
Response Unknown * * *   
Region:      
Auckland  -0.071 0.003 0.000   
Rest of North Island -0.089 0.003 0.000   
South Island -0.095 0.003 0.000   
Missing/Overseas -0.012 0.016 0.447   
Wellington  * * *   
 
* = omitted category 
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Appendix Three - Regression Six: 
 
Collective Employment Agreement (CEA) Model   
          
R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of   
0.697 0.486 0.485 0.079   
      
ANOVA     
        
Model Sum of df Mean Square F Sig 
Regression 128.310 41 3.130 503.700 0.000 
Residual 135.668 21836 0.006   
Total 263.978 21877       
      
 Unstandardized    
  B Std. Error Sig.   
Intercept 4.654 0.008 0.000   
Gender 0.015 0.001 0.000   
Contract Term 0.044 0.003 0.000   
Hours Worked 0.005 0.002 0.007   
Contract Type * * *   
Union membership status -0.015 0.002 0.000   
Age:      
>20 -0.06 0.008 0.000   
20-24 -0.029 0.004 0.000   
25-29 -0.009 0.004 0.027   
30-34 0.016 0.004 0.000   
35-39 0.019 0.004 0.000   
40-44 0.022 0.004 0.000   
45-49 0.027 0.004 0.000   
50-54 0.028 0.004 0.000   
55-59 0.024 0.004 0.000   
60-64 0.01 0.004 0.013   
65+ * * *   
Tenure (years):      
>1 -0.084 0.002 0.000   
1 -0.064 0.002 0.000   
2 -0.053 0.002 0.000   
3 -0.038 0.002 0.000   
4 -0.035 0.002 0.000   
5 to 9 -0.024 0.002 0.000   
10+ * * *   
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Ethnicity:      
Maori 0.005 0.003 0.155   
Asian 0.02 0.002 0.000   
Non-NZ European 0.01 0.003 0.000   
Other Ethnic Groups 0.028 0.003 0.000   
Pacific Islanders 0.018 0.006 0.002   
Unknown 0.017 0.003 0.000   
Pakeha * * *   
Employer size (ees):      
>200 0.01 0.007 0.115   
200-999 0.03 0.002 0.000   
1000+ * * *   
Occupational category:      
Legislative and admin 0.181 0.018 0.000   
Corporate manager 0.005 0.007 0.000   
Physical, Mathematical & 
Engineering Science 
Professionals 
0.04 0.008 0.000   
Life Science & Health 
Professionals 
0.017 0.008 0.028   
Teaching Professionals 0.014 0.007 0.056   
Other Professionals 0.05 0.007 0.000   
Associate Professionals -0.057 0.007 0.000   
Clerks -0.097 0.007 0.000   
Labourers and Trade Workers -0.066 0.007 0.000   
Response Unknown * * *   
Region:      
Auckland  -0.029 0.002 0.000   
Rest of North Island -0.035 0.002 0.000   
South Island -0.037 0.002 0.000   
Missing/Overseas 0.014 0.007 0.059   
Wellington  * * *   
 
* = omitted category 
 
